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EMPLOYMENT LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
Samuel R. Bagenstos*
What is the normative justification for individual employment law? For a
number of legal scholars, the answer is economic efficiency. Other scholars
argue, to the contrary, that employment law protects against (vaguely defined)
imbalances of bargaining power and exploitation. Against both of these positions, this Article argues that individual employment law is best understood as
advancing a particular conception of equality. That conception, which many
legal and political theorists have called social equality, focuses on eliminating
hierarchies of social status. This Article argues that individual employment
law, like employment discrimination law, is justified as preventing employers
from contributing to or entrenching social status hierarchies—and that it is
justifiable even if it imposes meaningful costs on employers.
This Article argues that the social equality theory can help us critique, defend,
elaborate, and extend the rules of individual employment law. It illustrates
this point by showing how concerns about social equality, at an inchoate level,
underlie some classic arguments against employment at will. It also shows
how engaging with the question of social equality can enrich analysis of a
number of currently salient doctrinal issues in employment law, including
questions regarding how the law should protect workers’ privacy and political
speech, the proper scope of maximum-hours laws and prohibitions on retaliation, and the framework that should govern employment arbitration.
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Introduction
Last fall, as the presidential election campaign raced to a conclusion, the
New Republic reported that Murray Energy, a large coal mining company,
“ha[d] for years pressured salaried employees to give to the [company’s]
political action committee (PAC) and to Republican candidates chosen by
the company.”1 According to that report, “[i]nternal documents show that
company officials track who is and is not giving,”2 and that the company’s
CEO, Robert Murray, took an intense personal interest in which employees
gave money.3 The report anonymously quoted two individuals who had
worked as managers at the company to the following effect:
“There’s a lot of coercion,” says one of them. “I just wanted to work, but
you feel this constant pressure that, if you don’t contribute, your job’s at
stake. You’re compelled to do this whether you want to or not.” Says the
second: “They will give you a call if you’re not giving. . . . It’s expected you
give Mr. Murray what he asks for.”4

When Governor Romney visited a coal mine operated by a Murray-owned
company for a rally, a company official acknowledged that workers were told
that attendance at the event “would be both mandatory and unpaid.”5
1. Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner’s Donor, New Republic, Oct. 25, 2012, at 18, available at
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/108140/coal-miners-donor-mitt-romneybenefactor.
2. Id.
3. See id. at 19.
4. Id. at 18 (alteration in original); cf. Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the
Workplace: Using the First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 Ohio
St. L.J. 341–42 (1994) (“[In 1992, a] CEO sent faxes to regional managers strongly recommending that they purchase seats at a candidate’s fundraiser if they intended to have a future
with the corporation; one who failed to do so lost his job.”); Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic
Speech Shouldn’t Get Employees Fired, Legal Times, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://
www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005435749&slreturn=20130419174324 (“William Niess, a Democrat in Wisconsin, refused to make a political contribution to the party
favored by his boss. As a result, he was fired in 1996.”).
5. Sabrina Eaton, Coal Miners Lost Pay When Mitt Romney Visited Their Mine to Promote Coal Jobs, Plain Dealer (Aug. 28, 2012, 5:40 AM) (updated 7:15 AM), http://
www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/08/coal_miners_lost_pay_when_mitt.html; cf. Bingham, supra note 4, at 341 (“During the 1992 presidential campaign, employers required that
employees sit through a presidential candidate’s stump speech as part of a company-wide
captive audience.”).
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Are Murray Energy’s activities, as reported by the New Republic, troubling? If so, why? In this Article, I argue that those activities are, indeed,
troubling, and that understanding why reveals a high-level normative principle that can help us explain, justify, and critique the broad sweep of individual employment law.6
The problem with Murray Energy’s reported activities, I submit, is that
they threaten social equality. Social equality, as described by a number of
scholars, seeks “a society in which people regard and treat one another as
equals, in other words a society that is not marked by status divisions such
that one can place different people in hierarchically ranked categories.”7
Murray Energy’s reported activities threaten social equality because they enable the company to transform its economic power over its employees into
an additional voice in the political realm. And that additional voice enhances
the company’s political power while at the same time squelching the political
power of its employees. To the extent that employment law limits activities
like the ones in which Murray Energy reportedly engaged—and employment laws in many states do limit these activities—the law serves social
equality. To the extent that the law does not limit those activities, a social
equality perspective suggests that it should.
But social equality is threatened even when employers do not seek to
leverage their economic power over their employees into additional political
power. Social equality is threatened as well when employer practices needlessly lead to hierarchies within or outside the workplace. Although some
hierarchies within the workplace may be inevitable in productive enterprises, it is not inevitable that workers should bow and scrape before their
bosses. Nor is it inevitable that employees who are subordinate within the
workplace should, as a result, be limited in their opportunities to participate
in community life outside the workplace. When one takes these aspects of
6. When I refer in this Article to “individual employment law,” or the shorthand “employment law,” I refer to those legal doctrines that govern the employment relationship but
that do not prohibit group-based discrimination (which would be “employment discrimination law”) and do not regulate unionization and collective bargaining (which would be “labor
law”). For an argument that distinctions between these three pillars of workplace law are increasingly dissolving—a dissolution to which my argument would, at one level, contribute—
see Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 163 (2007).
7. David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 Ratio 222, 224 (1997). For other recent elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What Is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality
as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 Res Publica 107 (2012), and T.M. Scanlon, When Does
Equality Matter? (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/Intellectual_Life/ltw-Scanlon.pdf. For a recent application to tort law, see Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 243 (2011). Other scholars have
used the labels “equal citizenship,” e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6–11
(1977); “social citizenship,” e.g., T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class 8 (1950);
William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1 passim (1999);
“democratic citizenship,” e.g., Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276–78 (1983); and “democratic equality,” e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson,
What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999), to refer to roughly the same idea.
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social equality seriously, they have implications for a wide array of employment law doctrines.
This Article offers a social equality theory of individual employment
law. It draws on my earlier work that offered a similar theory of employment
discrimination law.8 In that earlier work, I argued that employment discrimination law serves the goal of advancing social equality. Although employment discrimination law imposes undeniable costs on employers, I argued
that those costs are justified because employers can properly be required to
forgo some profit to avoid contributing to a system of social inequality. A
very similar argument, I contend, provides a justification for individual employment law: Individual employment law can profitably be understood as
pervasively promoting social equality. And specific employment law doctrines can profitably be elaborated, assessed, and critiqued by reference to
that conception of equality.
When applied to employment discrimination law, the notion of social
equality has had a distinctly group-oriented cast. In my own work on employment discrimination and social equality, for example, I argued that antidiscrimination law should be understood as ensuring that socially salient
racial, gender, disability, or other groups do not experience stigma or systematic disadvantage.9 That, I explained, is what justifies the law’s protection
of particular classes and prohibition of particular classifications.10
But outside the antidiscrimination precinct, individual employment law
does not protect particular axes of identity. Its protections are, in an important sense, universal.11 The social equality that individual employment law
can protect is also universal. It targets not merely those practices that entrench caste-based deprivations but also those practices that would tend to
undermine any worker’s status as an equal to her employer, boss, or supervisor. The application and effects of employment law may be especially important for people in lower socioeconomic classes—the social equality
project seeks to ensure that hierarchies of work do not harden into classtype hierarchies of person. But the project extends more broadly than simply redistributing from a disadvantaged class. When we explore the application of employment law outside the discrimination context, we will find that
8. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837–70 (2003).
9.

See id. at 839–40.

10. See id. at 846–48.
11. A focus on bolstering the rules of individual employment law thus responds to calls
for universalistic social-welfare interventions, see, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the
Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement 143–45 (2009), and in particular
for interventions in the employment relationship that focus on social class as much as on other
group identities, see, e.g., Forbath, supra note 7. But cf. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality?
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 Ind. L.J. 1219 (2011) (arguing that
universalistic protections may disserve equality interests); Guy Davidov, The Goals of Regulating Work: Between Universalism and Selectivity, U. Toronto L.J. (forthcoming) (arguing that
labor and employment law should not entirely abandon the selective approach in favor of a
universalistic one).
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concerns about social equality—although not named as such—lie at the
heart of the questions the doctrine asks and answers.
This is not to say that employment law’s rules, as currently structured,
always do promote social equality. Indeed, one of the benefits of a social
equality focus is that it offers a critical lens through which we can examine
current doctrine. When viewed through that lens, many of today’s employment law rules come up short. But a focus on social equality helps to show
that the seemingly disparate critiques of a wide array of doctrines can be
profitably understood as stemming from the same underlying goal. Although the general principle of social equality can hardly dictate answers to
specific doctrinal questions, it can orient critiques of the current doctrine
and ground a case for reform. Or so I hope to show.
The social equality theory differs in significant ways from the two leading normative approaches to employment law in the literature. One approach, exemplified by the work of Stewart Schwab and Alan Hyde, argues
that individual employment law is justified if, and to the extent that, it serves
the goal of economic efficiency.12 Employment law rules should thus be explained, assessed, and if necessary reformed, based on whether they make
labor markets more efficient.
In line with that argument, employment law scholarship fairly drips
with economic-efficiency analysis. The number of employment law articles
relying on economic arguments is far too numerous to cite—or even to
count. But there are a couple of telling data points: A leading casebook on
employment law uses economic efficiency as its first “strong unifying
theme[ ],” and it “uses economics to relate seemingly disparate issues and to
explore issues in a rigorous way.”13 Leading defenses and critiques of employment law’s baseline principle—the at-will rule—rely heavily on economic analysis.14 Indeed, one can find leading scholars offering economic
analyses of virtually any employment law problem.15 Although much scholarship relating to particular employment law issues continues to take the
12. See Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour
Law 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of
Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 Ind. L.J. 29 (2001); see also Alan
Hyde, Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law:
On Purposeless Restatement, 13 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 87, 89 (2009) (“[E]mployment
legislation is . . . typically adopted when market failures prevent atomized markets from reaching efficient results. Typical reasons for these market failures include inelasticity in the supply
of labor; collective action problems among workers; low trust and opportunism that prevent
the formation of efficient long-term contracts; and information asymmetries.”).
13. Steven L. Willborn et al., Employment Law: Cases and Materials 10 (5th ed.
2012).
14. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to
Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1901 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the
Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 120–22 (2002).
15. For a recent example, see Christine Jolls, Rationality and Consent in Privacy Law
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing worker privacy protections). For
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form of traditional doctrinal analysis, it is fair to say that economic efficiency provides the only overarching normative theory of employment law.
The other approach argues that the government should regulate the employment relationship to rectify imbalances of bargaining power between
employers and employees. Employment law, in this view, “[p]rotect[s] the
weaker party to the employment contract” against “exploitation.”16 As I argue below, the asymmetric vulnerability of (most) employers and (most)
workers is an important building block in justifying employment law. But
the concept of unequal bargaining power is notoriously slippery.17 And the
best arguments for imposing duties on employers focus not on fairness to
individual employees but on the systemic effects—in and out of the workplace—of allowing employers to engage in particular practices. The social
equality theory focuses on just these sorts of systemic effects.
I do not, of course, write on a completely clean slate here. In an article
on the diverse philosophical foundations of labor and employment law, Horacio Spector devotes four pages to arguing that what he calls “equal autonomy”—roughly what I call social equality—offers one of the more
promising normative bases for regulation of the workplace.18 My project
here also has undeniable affinities with Noah Zatz’s argument that the minimum wage—a paradigm individual-employment regulation—can be justified in civil rights terms.19 Indeed, Professor Zatz expressly analogizes to my
earlier antidiscrimination work in support of his argument.20 Aditi Bagchi
also argues for taking social equality into account in employment law, although she does not offer social equality as an overarching theory of the law
in this area.21 My project has an affinity, too, with David Yamada’s argument
an older example, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J. 1, 21 (1992)
(discussing workplace safety protections).
16. Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in
Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship 91, 111 (Bruce E. Kaufman
ed., 1997) (describing the dominant view “[o]utside the law-and-economics camp”).
17. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev.
563, 615–20 (1982).
18. See Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
1119, 1144–47 (2006). Professor William Forbath has similarly shown how ideas of social
equality played a crucial role in the adoption of (collective) labor law in the United States. See
Forbath, supra note 7, at 59–60, 69–70.
19. See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to
Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 5–6 (arguing that “ongoing resistance to
economic reductionism in the realm of civil rights—as occurs in antidiscrimination law—is
forging intellectual tools of wider significance” that help us see that economic “analysis arguably misses the point” when justifying the minimum wage). In a forthcoming piece, Brishen
Rogers also defends the minimum wage, on the basis of social equality. See Brishen Rogers,
Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality (Aug. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
20. See Zatz, supra note 19, at 42–43.
21. See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 579.
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“that human dignity should supplant ‘markets and management’ as the central framework for analyzing and shaping American employment law”22—
although I think that social equality, rather than the more multifaceted concept of human dignity, offers a more helpful organizing principle.23 And it
resonates with Richard Michael Fischl’s argument that “forthrightly pursuing [workplace law] reform in the name of social values such as democratic
and humane ordering” is “a more promising starting point than casting our
lot with the supposed laws of supply and demand.”24 But this Article represents the first systematic effort to describe and defend a social equality theory of individual employment law and to sketch its implications for an array
of employment law doctrines.
Part I sets forth the basic normative argument for a social equality theory of employment law. In that Part, I first describe the notion of social
equality and defend it as an attractive conception of equality. I then examine
what sorts of social and institutional practices social equality demands. Finally, I discuss some important limitations of the social equality principle,
with a particular focus on employers’ interests in avoiding costly regulation.
Part II examines how social equality can help us understand, explain,
and critique a wide variety of employment law doctrines. In that Part, I first
show how social equality concerns underlie some classic critiques of the employment-at-will rule. I then explain how social equality illuminates a number of enduring and currently hot debates in the employment law field,
including those regarding workers’ privacy, off-work political speech, and
whistleblowing, as well as the role of arbitration in resolving employment
disputes and the coverage of maximum-hour legislation. As I hope to show,
employment law pervasively implicates questions of social equality.
I. A Social Equality Theory of Employment Law
I contend that we should understand the goal of individual employment
law, like the goal of employment discrimination law, as promoting social
equality. In an article published a decade ago, I argued that employment
discrimination law is justified because it prohibits employers from contributing to entrenched social inequalities.25 The argument, in brief, went like
this: Rather than enforcing a rule of interpersonal ethics, the goal of antidiscrimination law is to eliminate a system that entrenches subordination and
occupational segregation—key threats to social equality.26 Employer discrimination, of course, is a central component of such a system. It is fair to
22. David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 523–24 (2009).
23. See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev.
169 (2011) (describing various conceptions of dignity in American law, of which equality is
only one).
24. Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 Marq. L.
Rev. 947, 957–58 (2011).
25. Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 837–70.
26. Id. at 839–44.
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impose liability on a discriminating employer—at least where the employer
“can avoid contributing to the social harms of subordination at a reasonable
cost”—because such an employer is at fault: “[H]e would rather retain some
personal benefit (be it the satisfaction of a taste for discrimination or the
realization of dollars-and-cents profits) than avoid contributing to a subordinating system.”27 This justification supports not only prohibitions on animus-based discrimination but also prohibitions on “rational” intentional
discrimination and even requirements of reasonable accommodation.28
A roughly parallel argument can be made to justify—and to elaborate
and evaluate the rules of—individual employment law. But the threats to
social equality are different outside the discrimination context. Where employment discrimination law targets the threats to social equality caused by
occupational segregation and group-based subordination, individual employment law should be understood as targeting the threat to social equality
posed by a boss’s ability to leverage her economic power over workers into a
more general social hierarchy in and out of the workplace. As I show in Part
II below, employers have numerous opportunities to exploit this sort of leverage. Many of the key debates in employment law—both the enduring debates and those that are especially “hot” today—can be well understood as
focusing on this social equality concern. As in the employment discrimination context, an employer is in the best position to avert these threats to
social equality, for it is the employer’s acts that construct and entrench a
system of social hierarchy. And as with employment discrimination law, individual employment law, properly construed, imposes only a reasonable
burden on employers to counteract these threats.
Section I.A offers a general description and defense of the concept of
social equality as it has been articulated by legal and political theorists. Section I.B explores what social equality demands of legal and social institutions, focusing in particular on how those demands play out beyond the
context of group-based stigma and subordination that has been the major
focus of social equality advocates in the legal academy. Finally, Section I.C
discusses the limits on what social equality can legitimately demand of
employers.
A. A Description and Defense of Social Equality
At its most fundamental level, social equality is the idea that—regardless
of the various material inequalities that are pervasive and may be inevitable—each of us deserves to be treated as an equal member of our community.29 We each are thus equally entitled to participate fully in the public life
(political and civic) of our democratic republic. We are entitled to be “free
27. Id. at 858.
28. Id. passim.
29. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 7, at 277 (describing “[d]emocratic citizenship” as a
status in which “[t]here is one norm of proper regard for the entire population of citizens”
and in which the norms of respect depend not on social position but on treating ourselves and
others as “full and equal member[s]” or “active participant[s]” in the community); Karst,
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from domination.”30 And we each are entitled to equal “deference or regard”
in our everyday relations with others in the community.31 As Michael Walzer
puts it, “This is the lively hope named by the word equality: no more bowing
and scraping, fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more
high-and-mightiness; no more masters, no more slaves.”32 Kenneth Karst
captures the point by quoting the following (aspirational) line from Simone
de Beauvoir: “[T]he rich American has no grandeur; the poor man no [servility]; human relations in daily life are on a footing of equality . . . .”33
Perhaps this form of social equality finds its ultimate expression in George
Orwell’s observations of Barcelona early in the Spanish Civil War: “Waiters
and shop-walkers looked you in the face and treated you as an equal. Servile
and even ceremonial forms of speech had temporarily disappeared.”34 Borrowing from Professor Walzer and philosopher Gerald Gaus, Jason Solomon
refers to “a socially-equal society” as “a ‘society of misters,’ where . . . everyone from the gardener to the CEO is addressed as ‘mister’ ”35—in other
words, a society marked by “the absence of any natural ranking of individuals into those who command and those who obey.”36
A variety of theoretical perspectives might lead one to find social equality attractive as a conception of equality. From a Kantian liberal perspective,
one might start from the premise that each individual is of “equal moral
worth”37 and deserves “equal concern and respect.”38 As Carina Fourie argues, “A rather straightforward interpretation of equal moral worth would
be likely to consider it incompatible with treating people as inferior or superior.”39 One might get to the same place from a communitarian perspective.
The argument would run that all members of our community deserve equal
respect, not by virtue of anything intrinsic to the moral worth of persons
supra note 7, at 5 (“The essence of equal citizenship is the dignity of full membership in the
society.”).
30. Walzer, supra note 7, at xiii.
31.

Karst, supra note 7, at 5–6.

32. Walzer, supra note 7, at xiii.
33. Karst, supra note 7, at 11 (alterations in original) (quoting Simone de Beauvoir,
America Day by Day 261 (Patrick Dudley trans., Grove Press 1953)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
34. George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia 5 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1st Am. ed.
1952) (1938).
35. Solomon, supra note 7, at 254 (quoting Walzer, supra note 7, at 252). One wonders where the “misses” are in such a society. But I’ll let that pass.
36. Id. (quoting Gerald Gaus, Political Concepts and Political Theories 143
(Westview Press 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. E.g., Anderson, supra note 7, at 312; Fourie, supra note 7, at 118.
38. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 6, 411 (2000); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 198–99, 273 (1977); Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination
Wrong? 6 (2008).
39.

Fourie, supra note 7, at 118.
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but instead because of their membership in the community.40 One might
also get there by way of the American Republican tradition, which opposed
domination, subordination, and hierarchy, and which found expression—
among other places—in the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.41
In legal and philosophical writing, the conception of social equality is
typically deployed as an argument against practices that impose group-based
harm. This group-based understanding of social equality underlies many
commentators’ defenses (including my own) of antidiscrimination law.42
Professor Karst argues that “even in these applications, the main energies
released by the equal citizenship principle are individualistic.”43 Whether or
not one agrees with that assessment, it should be evident that the idea of
equal citizenship or social equality has substantial applications even outside
the context of group-based discrimination. Practices that entrench hierarchies based on socioeconomic class, for example, clearly raise social equality
concerns,44 as do practices that create other social status hierarchies.45 Many
employment practices—even those that draw no group-based distinctions—
raise social equality concerns of the latter sort.
To be sure, one can imagine objections—from both directions—to a
focus on social equality. On the one hand, one might argue that social
equality does not go far enough, for any fully satisfying conception of equality must focus on distribution of material goods.46 And, indeed, in American
political discourse, the supporters of social equality have included neoliberals who have used the conception to argue against redistributive welfare
policy.47
There is much to this point, although political and legal philosophers
have gone around and around in debating which of these theories of equality deserve our allegiance. Scholars such as Elizabeth Anderson and Carina
40. Professor Walzer’s arguments tend in this direction, see Walzer, supra note 7, at
276–77, as do Professor Sandel’s related arguments against certain sorts of commodification,
see, e.g., Chapter 1 of Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of
Markets 17–41 (2012), which I think is best understood as making a communitarian argument that the queue is often a fairer means of distribution than the market.
41. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 1459, 1477–78 (2012).
42. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality
76–77 (1996); Karst, supra note 7, at 7–8. I cite other examples in Bagenstos, supra note 8, at
839–44.
43. Karst, supra note 7, at 8. In a recent article, Professor Karst brings the point full
circle by arguing that protecting fundamental individual liberties can advance the equal-citizenship status of members of disadvantaged and stigmatized groups. See Kenneth L. Karst, The
Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 99, 140–42
(2007).
44. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 7.
45. See Miller, supra note 7, at 232.
46. For an argument against distributive equality as the theory underlying employment
discrimination law, see Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 840–41.
47. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality (1992).
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Fourie have argued that what I call social equality is in fact the most attractive specifically egalitarian conception of equality.48 Moreover, David Miller
and others have narrowed the practical gap between social and distributive
equality theories by emphasizing the degree to which a more equal distribution is necessary to secure social equality.49 But these arguments are not
essential to my position. I do not argue that social equality is the only or
even the most attractive conception of equality; rather, I argue only that it is
the most relevant to understanding, elaborating, and critiquing the body of
individual employment law. For that purpose, it is enough that social equality represents at least one attractive conception of equality and that it is a
conception that employment law is well positioned to serve.
The law governing individual employment relationships is in fact especially well positioned to serve the goal of social equality, even if current rules
do not always live up to their potential. And while aspects of individual
employment law (notably the minimum wage) may also serve more distributive egalitarian goals, much of that body of law is irrelevant to—or even in
tension with—those goals.50 Social equality may in fact be the theory that
holds the greatest capacity to explain and justify the overall sweep of individual employment law.
From the other direction, one might argue that social equality—however justifiable as a guide to individual ethics or morality—is not something
the state can or should mandate. Such a conception of equality, one might
argue, smacks of mind control and the inappropriate imposition of politically correct views on the populace.51 To be sure, some theorists of social
equality—most notably Andrew Koppelman—argue that the law should engage in a thoroughgoing “project of cultural transformation” that aims to
eliminate (without necessarily directly suppressing) those attitudes that sustain social inequality.52 Even though such a project does have disturbingly
illiberal overtones, one need not understand the social equality project as
being quite so ambitious. A legal regime can seek to advance social equality
by focusing on conduct rather than attitudes—by eliminating the practices
and economic levers that empower individuals to treat others as hierarchical
subordinates. As I argue in Part II, this is a conception of social equality that
fits individual employment law well.
48.

Fourie, supra note 7, at 108; see also Anderson, supra note 7, at 312–13.

49. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 235 (“If we want our society to be egalitarian, then
we will try to shape our distributive practices so that the emergence of hierarchy is discouraged; in particular we will try to avoid the emergence of large-scale, cumulative inequalities of
advantage which make it difficult for people to live together on terms of equality, even if
politically they are all defined as equals.”).
50. For attempts to justify the minimum wage not as aiming at material redistribution
so much as at social equality, see Zatz, supra note 19, and Rogers, supra note 19.
51. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1588 (1997)
(arguing against Professor Koppelman’s view).
52. Koppelman, supra note 42, at 2.
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B. What Does Social Equality Demand?
I should be a bit more specific about what the conception of social
equality demands. Most centrally, it demands what Professor Walzer calls
“complex equality.”53 It demands that inequalities in economic position
(which may be beneficial or inevitable) not be automatically replicated into
inequalities in other areas of life that are key to participation in society.
Professor Miller puts the point this way:
[Social equality] does not require that people should be equal in power,
prestige or wealth, nor, absurdly, that they should score the same on natural dimensions such as strength or intelligence. What matters is how such
differences are regarded, and in particular whether they serve to construct
a social hierarchy in which A can unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior.
Where there is social equality, people feel that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions.54

In this respect, arguments about what social equality requires overlap with
arguments made by those theorists who are skeptical of certain forms of
commodification. Debra Satz, for example, argues that commodification of
a human activity is problematic if it leads to “outcomes that undermine the
conditions for citizens to interact as equals.”55 Elizabeth Anderson and Margaret Jane Radin, too, have expressed concern with the way commodification
of certain activities (notably sex and parenthood) can undermine social
equality.56 All markets, of course, consist of the buying and selling of human
activities and their fruits. But where some types of markets are concerned,
the risk that financial inequalities will be transformed into broader social
inequalities is patent.
What are those sorts of markets? Theorists of social equality have identified certain areas of life in which financial inequalities should not be allowed
to replicate themselves (in other words, in which commodification should be
limited or barred). One involves activities of democratic participation and
access to the government. As Professor Anderson argues, equals are “free to
participate in politics and the major institutions of civil society,” so the
equal ability “to participate in democratic self-government” is a key part of
“liv[ing] in an egalitarian community.”57 Along these lines, Professor Walzer
identifies the following as among the social goods that presumptively may
53. Walzer, supra note 7, at 3–30.
54. Miller, supra note 7, at 232.
55. Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of
Markets 101–02 (2010).
56. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 154, 168–89 (1993);
Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 131–53 (1996). Note that both Professor
Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity. In this sense, their arguments resemble those of Michael
Sandel. See Sandel, supra note 40. But for Professors Anderson and Radin, at least, the social
equality concerns lie fairly close to the surface of their arguments.
57. Anderson, supra note 7, at 315.
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not be commodified: political power and influence; basic political freedoms,
obligations, and offices; and basic governmental services.58 Social equality is
threatened when inequalities of wealth, income, or position are leveraged
into inequalities of access to the political process, community self-government, the process of petitioning for redress of grievances, or the protections
of the law.59 In this regard, as Professor Solomon has emphasized, the opportunity to call someone before a neutral tribunal to account for violation
of one’s rights is a central element of being a full and equal member of our
society.60
But social equality matters outside the context of democratic and civic
participation as well. In particular, where inequalities of wealth, income, or
position translate into hierarchies of status—in which “one person is treated
as a superior and another as an inferior” in some general sense—social
equality is threatened.61 To some extent, the concern here is one of domination and subordination. As Professor Anderson argues, “Equals are not
dominated by others; they do not live at the mercy of others’ wills.”62 This
antidomination concern also finds expression in the American Republican
tradition that informed the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.63 One
problem with domination is that a subordinate individual in such a relationship must often submit to humiliating and degrading rituals, such as literally
or figuratively engaging in the sort of “[b]owing and scraping” that Kant
argues is “unworthy of a human being.”64
We might legitimately fear that such domination is afoot when one person, because of her wealth, can induce another person with less wealth to
give up the sorts of activities or commitments that Professor Radin labels as
“integral to the self” or especially bound up with “personhood.”65 Even independent of domination, we might be especially concerned that social
58. Walzer, supra note 7, at 100–03; see also Don Herzog, How to Think About Equality, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1621, 1633 (2002) (arguing that political power should not be
commodified).
59. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 38, at 366 (“Citizen equality . . .
require[s] . . . that different groups of citizens not be disadvantaged, in their effort to gain
attention and respect for their views, by a circumstance so remote from the substance of
opinion or argument, or from the legitimate sources of influence, as wealth is.”).
60. Solomon, supra note 7, at 252–53. It is hardly surprising that in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, our nation’s first Reconstruction–era civil rights statute, the right “to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property” receives explicit protection against discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2006).
61.

Fourie, supra note 7, at 111.

62.

Anderson, supra note 7, at 315.

63. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 41.
64. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 188 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). For an effort to draw a connection between employment
law and Kant’s argument on this point, see Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception
of the Employee as a Person in Western Law, 23 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 577, 607 (2002).
65. Radin, supra note 56, at 56.
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equality is threatened when one class of people—defined by wealth or income—systematically gives up the choice to engage in those activities that
are especially important to defining and understanding the self.66
One particular threat to social equality is the phenomenon of asymmetric vulnerability.67 Where one individual is especially vulnerable to the exercise of another’s economic power, and the vulnerability is not reciprocated,
it will be easier for the less vulnerable person to establish a relationship of
domination over the more vulnerable one. Asymmetric vulnerability is a
particular concern in employment markets—especially in times of high unemployment. For an individual worker, having and keeping a job is supremely important. For an employer, by contrast, individual employees are
often replaceable or even fungible. For the worker, losing one’s job can cause
one to lose the means of making a living and obtaining self-respect and
respect from the community.68 Where jobs are scarce, a worker might be
willing to subordinate herself in all sorts of ways to ensure that she does not
lose hers.69 As I show in Part II, the employment relation is therefore a central arena in the battle for social equality.
C. The Limitations of the Principle
To end all social inequality is a goal that is beyond the reach of employment law—and likely of law itself. Even if law could achieve that goal, a
thoroughgoing effort to use law to eliminate social inequality root and
branch would likely require such intrusive interventions as to violate other
basic principles of our liberal state.70 But my argument is not that the law
should eliminate all sources of social inequality. It is far more modest. I
contend that employment practices are particularly likely to implicate issues
of social equality and that, when they do so, the law should presumptively
regulate those practices to remove the most significant threats to that goal.
Social equality is not an absolute goal that the law should pursue though the
heavens may fall. Legal rules must take account of the extent and incidence

66. There is, of course, a real question of paternalism here, which I discuss infra in
Section II.C.
67. See Satz, supra note 55, at 159.
68. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405–06, 1413–15 (1967) (discussing the harm to workers of losing a job); Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 163, 165–66 (2011) (same). On the importance
of work to workers’ equal-citizenship status, see Forbath, supra note 7, at 16–17, and Kenneth
L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 523
(1997).
69. This point finds support in the findings of Professors Gordon and Lenhardt that,
for many Latino immigrants, the need to keep a job in the United States makes them “reluctant to turn down jobs or to complain about work conditions.” Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1161, 1220–22 (2008).
70. See Hills, supra note 51, at 1592–614.
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of costs they impose, as well as of other values that should limit their
application.71
Most obviously, employment law rules should generally not prevent employers from engaging in remunerative business. The goal of employment
law, as I see it, is not to prevent employers from engaging in managerial or
entrepreneurial decisionmaking. Rather, it is to regulate those aspects of employer prerogative that impose significant threats to social equality without
sufficient countervailing benefits to society. Managers and owners are typically in the best position to determine what workplace arrangements maximize profitability. And, in general, an increase in profits increases the pool
of material goods available to workers in the enterprise and strengthens the
economy (which itself benefits workers).72 One must necessarily weigh the
degree to which employment law rules advance social equality against the
degree to which those rules limit profitability and economic growth.
Some employer actions may be gratuitously abusive. An example from
employment discrimination law is sexual harassment. The analog in the case
of individual employment law is a particularly intrusive invasion of a
worker’s privacy. Actions like these threaten social equality without enhancing the bottom line of the enterprise. The law can force employers to abandon these sorts of practices without imposing any monetary cost. Indeed, if
doing so makes it easier to attract and retain skilled workers, an employer
might actually realize a monetary benefit by abandoning abusive practices.73
To be sure, the supervisor would have to bear the cost of forgoing the utility
that she presumably obtains from engaging in abusive conduct. But we can
properly ignore that utility loss as stemming from illegitimate preferences.74
Even where it imposes some monetary cost, interference with employer
prerogatives in the service of social equality is still justified. As Matt Finkin
notes, employment law rules that impose costs on employers to serve societal interests are ubiquitous.75 The argument supporting these rules again
parallels the argument for prohibiting rational discrimination. Social inequality is an important social harm, and the employer is in the best position
71. See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 921.
72. Of course, the share that workers can obtain depends on the bargaining power of
the parties—which itself depends on legal rules such as support for collective bargaining—as
well as on the political feasibility of other redistributive policies by the government. There is
an important role for redistributive policies, but it largely lies outside individual employment
law.
73. One might question whether it is necessary for the law to step in to force employers
to do something that benefits them. In a perfectly competitive market, employers who engage
in abusive practices that make it difficult to attract skilled workers will be driven out of business. But markets are not perfectly competitive, and they can take a long time to drive out
abusive and inefficient practices. See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1411, 1423–30 (1986) (arguing that, even if the market would eventually drive discriminating employers out of business, Title VII accelerates our arrival at that efficient long-run
equilibrium).
74. This is an application of the notion of “laundering” preferences; the discussion in
text glosses over the complications of this notion. See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 885–89.
75. See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away from Work, 66 La. L. Rev. 945, 974 (2006).
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to avoid entrenching and reinforcing that harm. An employer that puts the
interest in obtaining the absolute maximum profit ahead of its obligation to
avoid contributing to that social harm is acting in a morally objectionable
manner—one for which it is fair to hold the employer accountable.
Employment discrimination law uses two principal techniques to determine when it is too costly to impose on employers an obligation to avoid
contributing to inequality. The first is domain restriction. Thus, the law does
not permit employers any defense for intentional race discrimination against
minorities, even if the discrimination is bottom-line rational.76 This rule
may be explained, at least in part, as reflecting the conclusion that forbearing from racial discrimination is rarely likely to impose heavy costs on a
particular employer—especially if all other employers are required to forbear as well. Particularly where the preferences of biased customers or coworkers make discrimination rational for an employer, we are willing to
impose on employers a short-term cost of increased friction in the workplace to achieve a long-term equilibrium in which those preferences disappear (or at least may not be consequential in any workplace).
For sex discrimination, by contrast, rational discrimination is permissible if sex is a “bona fide occupational qualification” (“BFOQ”) for the position in question.77 This rule reflects, in part, a judgment that forgoing sex
discrimination will sometimes impose intolerable costs on employers, at
least in two sorts of cases: (1) cases in which an entire line of business is
necessarily, and not merely contingently, built on sex differences (a line that
cannot be drawn without making normative judgments), and (2) cases in
which customer preferences to be served by a member of a particular sex rest
on concerns about gender privacy that our society still endorses.78
The second technique employment discrimination law uses is overt balancing. Thus, in cases in which an individual’s disability is incompatible
with the way a job is currently structured, courts will ask whether there is
any “reasonable accommodation” that will enable the individual to perform
“essential functions” of the job without imposing “undue hardship” on the
employer.79 In the case of employment practices that are alleged to violate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) because they have a disparate impact, the law requires that
courts ask whether the practice is “job-related” and “consistent with business necessity.”80
76. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 851–52 (discussing Title VII’s prohibition of
even rational intentional discrimination); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2007) (“On its
face, Title VII provides no BFOQ defense for race.”).
77.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).

78. For a good discussion of the cases in this area, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 147
(2004).
79.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (emphases added).

80. Id. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), 12112(b)(6).
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Unlike in the context of intentional race and sex discrimination, the law
of reasonable accommodation and disparate impact requires that courts engage directly in a balancing of interests. But in all of these areas, the law
filters the consideration of costs through its definition of the job at issue.
Crucially, the law requires courts (with more or less deference to an employer’s views) to make their own independent determinations of what the
job consists of.81 Because of the interest in avoiding social inequality, the law
takes away a bit of the employer’s managerial prerogative to define the nature of the job. And the law takes away that prerogative even when doing so
will impose costs on employers.
As I will show in Part II, these techniques have lessons for individual
employment law. Employment law can sometimes limit the costs it imposes
on employers through domain restriction. For example, I argue below
that—except where certain categories of employees are concerned—employment law should categorically bar employers from regulating their workers’
off-work speech or conduct. Such a rule will doubtless impose costs on employers who have legitimate, bottom-line-oriented reasons for concern
about their employees’ off-work conduct. But the costs to an employer are
likely to be much less—and the benefits for social equality much greater—
when an employer is barred from regulating off-work conduct than when it
is barred from regulating on-the-job conduct. Other times, individual employment law will do best by weighing employer costs directly in each case—
for example, the law involving employee privacy in the workplace.
As in the employment discrimination context, the definition of an employee’s job will be a crucial fulcrum of evaluation. And as in the employment discrimination context, an employer is not permitted absolute
prerogative to define the job—even when it has financial interests in doing
so. A coal company like Murray Energy may have an interest in ensuring
that its employees contribute to Republican candidates, if Republicans are
likely to support a regulatory environment that aids the company’s bottom
line. But to allow the company to define a miner’s job as extracting coal
from the ground plus writing checks to Republican candidates would allow
the company to leverage its economic power over employees into additional
political power, directly threatening social equality. The law should therefore
provide a check on the employer’s definition of job tasks.
Individual employment law does seem—at least at first glance—to implicate at least one concern that lacks a parallel in employment discrimination law. That is a concern about paternalism. Employment law imposes
terms on the employment relationship that the parties would otherwise be
legally free to adopt themselves if they so chose. Orthodox economic theory
tells us that when employees do not insist on including a given term, their

81. See, e.g., id. § 12111(8) (“[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment
as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” (emphases added)).
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choice indicates that they value that term less than whatever they were offered in exchange for it.82 To require employers to provide that term anyway—at least where an employer is free to take away something else in
exchange for including the mandatory term—would therefore make the employee worse off—according to her own preferences—than she would be in
the absence of such a mandate.
There are all sorts of reasons, even from within economic theory, to
believe that this orthodox account fails in a wide range of cases to accurately
describe the effects of employment law mandates.83 But the account clearly
offers an accurate description at least some of the time. A social equality
approach helps to show why that is nonetheless not a decisive argument
against imposing mandatory terms through employment law. The imposition of mandatory employment terms may force some workers to accept
deals that do not optimally satisfy their preferences. But a social equality
model posits that the goal of employment law is not the satisfaction of individual employees’ preferences. The goal is a systemic one: to prevent and
eliminate significant threats to social equality. In this respect, again, individual employment law is analogous to employment discrimination law; even if
some employees would be better off without antidiscrimination protections,
that cost is nonetheless justified because the body of law disentrenches segregation and subordination.
None of this is to say that the costs imposed on individual workers are
irrelevant to an assessment of employment law rules, even under a social
equality theory. If those rules significantly increased unemployment, for example, there would be a strong basis to argue against such rules, not least
because increased unemployment itself undermines social equality.84 And
where, as Julie Suk shows regarding France’s highly rigid employment law
system, disemployment effects fall especially heavily on already stigmatized
and segregated social groups, social equality provides a doubly strong basis

82. For arguments to this effect, see Epstein, supra note 14, at 955, and Morriss, supra
note 14, at 1902. Law-and-economics supporters are not the only ones concerned about this
problem. This concern with the possibly perverse effects of banning problematic commodification is a central aspect of Professor Radin’s writing, see Radin, supra note 56, at 123–30, and
the writing of other feminist scholars, see Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That Is Not the Question, in Rethinking Commodification 362
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
83. Professor Willborn offers a number of reasons, from within economic theory, why
mandatory terms may make workers better off. See Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment
Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 101
(1988). For arguments focused on employees’ lack of full information, see sources cited infra
note 101. For arguments, rooted in economic theory, that the effects of mandatory employment terms will depend on the respective value of those terms to employers and employees
and on the heterogeneity of employees’ preferences, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000), and Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of
Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 177 (1989).
84.

On the importance of work to social equality, see sources cited supra note 68.

November 2013]

Employment Law and Social Equality

243

to criticize them.85 Whether any of the particular rules I discuss in Part II
will lead to such effects requires serious empirical analysis. But each of those
rules seems quite far from imposing the sorts of dislocations that the French
system has—and we can design those rules to minimize the risk of that
result.
II. Doctrinal Implications
Theorists of social equality have long recognized the workplace as a key
location for egalitarian struggle. Thus, Professor Walzer argues that the “distribution of hard [read, unpleasant] work” should not “corrupt the distributive spheres with which it overlaps, carrying poverty into the sphere of
money, degradation into the sphere of honor, weakness and resignation into
the sphere of power.”86 The workplace seems especially threatening to social
equality. In part, this is because of the degradation attendant to many jobs—
the “hard work” of which Professor Walzer speaks. Studs Terkel captures this
sense of degradation when he describes work, for some, as “a Monday
through Friday sort of dying.”87 Even where the work itself is not degrading,
most workplaces remain exceptionally hierarchical institutions, and recent
changes in the organization of work—by eliminating many firms’ implicit
long-term commitments to employees—have only made the problem
worse.88 An important task of employment law, I argue, is to prevent necessary or well-accepted hierarchies within the workplace from transforming
into broader hierarchies of person or of social status in and out of the
workplace.
In this Part, I sketch some ways in which this understanding suggests
possible defenses, critiques, and reforms of employment law doctrine. As I
hope to show, a social equality focus has implications for a wide array of
employment law rules. In some doctrinal areas, such a focus suggests quite
significant changes in current rules; in others, it suggests milder tweaks or
extensions; and in still others, it suggests that current rules have it about
right. But my goal in this Part is not to make a comprehensive case for any
particular reform or defense of any particular rule. Any such attempt must
engage in depth with the specific considerations at play in a particular rule
choice. Although I offer some suggestions in that direction, my goal in this
Part is narrower: first, to show how employment law rules pervasively implicate questions of social equality; and second, to suggest that a focus on those
questions can enrich our analysis—and sharpen our critiques and defenses—of those rules.

85. See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (2007).
86. Walzer, supra note 7, at 183.
87. Studs Terkel, Working xi (1974).
88. See Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation
for the Changing Workplace 68–72 (2004).
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In Section II.A, I argue that a social equality approach bolsters longstanding critiques of the employment-at-will rule. That rule is the most debated principle of employment law, and I cannot hope (and do not attempt)
to resolve the debate. Rather, I attempt to show that classic challenges to atwill employment rest on an inchoate version of the social equality approach
I articulate in this Article. The debate over the rule thus provides an apt first
illustration of my argument. In Section II.B, I argue that social equality also
demands legal rules that generally respect worker privacy, and I show how a
social equality approach helps us elaborate those rules.
In Section II.C, I return to the example with which I began this Article. I
argue that a social equality approach suggests that the law should limit private employers’ ability to regulate the political speech of their employees. I
discuss this question more extensively than I do the other doctrinal areas in
this Part because regulation of workers’ political speech is currently an important area of discussion in employment law and because considering that
area highlights the ways in which a social equality approach can accommodate employer interests. Section II.D extends this discussion to antiretaliation and whistleblower-protection statutes. Section II.E discusses the
(ambiguous) implications of a social equality approach for the rise of
mandatory employment arbitration. And Section II.F shows how social
equality ideas underlie limitations on maximum-hours laws and child labor.
For many of the doctrines I discuss, hints of social equality arguments
already appear in the scholarly, judicial, and political discourse. For others,
social equality may be more of a novel justification. In all events, I contend
that social equality is a useful concept in understanding and critiquing individual employment law.
A. The Employment-at-Will Rule
A core aspect of social equality is what de Beauvoir described as “human
relations in daily life [being] on a footing of equality.”89 Precisely because
work is central to most people’s day-to-day lives, the legal rules governing
the employment relationship can have a significant effect on the equality or
inequality of daily social relations. In particular, given the disproportionate
power that owners and supervisors often have over their workers, the workplace continually threatens to create and entrench status hierarchies. Employment law can help to undermine these hierarchies. But too often it fails
to meet this potential, and it bolsters those hierarchies instead. The strong
default rule of employment at will is a prime example.
The most significant source of workplace hierarchy is the boss’s power
to fire. Under the baseline employment-at-will rule that continues to prevail
in all American jurisdictions but Montana,90 an employer can terminate an
89. See Karst, supra note 7, at 11 (quoting de Beauvoir, supra note 33, at 261) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
90. See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 to -915 (2011); Arnow-Richman, supra note 14,
at 5 n.9 (“[E]mployment at will is the established law in every state except Montana, which has
modified the default rule by statute.”).
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employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all—unless the
employer’s reason is specifically forbidden by some external source of law,
such as an antidiscrimination statute. And even when the employer does act
for a forbidden reason, the at-will rule makes it difficult as a practical matter
for the employee to prove it because that rule facilitates employers’ assertion
of pretextual reasons for termination.91
Defenders of the at-will rule argue that, by allowing either party to terminate the relationship at any time, it serves equality interests.92 But although the rights of an employer and an employee to terminate the
relationship at will are formally symmetrical, the worker often needs a particular job more than the employer needs a particular worker. This is especially true in times of high unemployment.
The at-will rule therefore gives bosses ample power to require employees
to engage in the “bowing and scraping, fawning and toadying”93 that is the
bête noire of social equality. Chris Bertram, Corey Robin, and Alex
Gourevitch argue that the at-will rule makes it “difficult to conceive of a less
free institution for adults than the average workplace,” where “[o]n pain of
being fired,” workers “can be commanded to pee or forbidden to pee”; can
be “forbidden to wear what they want, say what they want (and at what
decibel), and associate with whom they want”; and “can be fired for donating a kidney to their boss (fired by the same boss, that is), refusing to have
their person or effects searched, calling the boss a ‘cheapskate’ in a personal
letter, and more.”94 As Professor Bagchi contends, practices like these
demonstrate—and enact—social status hierarchies within the workplace.95
These sorts of practices seem abusive and arbitrary in many cases. Arguments against employment at will often focus on this sort of employer abuse
or arbitrariness and on the “morally reprehensible employer motives” that
may underlie it.96 But as I have argued in the employment discrimination
context, motive or malice ought not to be the crucial factors in determining
whether the law regulates an employer’s conduct. The problem is not simply
that individual employees have no remedy for the abusive acts of their
bosses. Rather, a social equality perspective suggests that the problem rests
in the entire system of social relations that the at-will rule engenders.
91. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 Tex.
L. Rev. 1655, 1670 (1995); see generally Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” That Swallows
the Exceptions, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 53 (2007).
92. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 954–55.
93. Walzer, supra note 7, at xiii.
94. Chris Bertram, Corey Robin & Alex Gourevitch, Let It Bleed: Libertarianism and the
Workplace, Crooked Timber (July 1, 2012), http://crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleedlibertarianism-and-the-workplace/.
95. See Bagchi, supra note 21, at 591.
96. Arnow-Richman, supra note 14, at 9–10 (arguing that many advocates of just-cause
protections have “presented at-will employment as enabling arbitrary, malicious, and even
socially harmful employer behavior,” and that the opposition to employment at will has been
based on “the condemnation of morally reprehensible employer motives”).
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Some of the classic critiques of employment at will focus on these sorts
of systemic effects. They thus rest on at least an inchoate version of a social
equality approach. Lawrence Blades, for example, captures the crucial point
in his critique: because employment at will effectively “forces the non-union
employee to rely on the whim of his employer for preservation of his livelihood,” it “tends to make him a docile follower of his employer’s every
wish.”97 A worker who knows that she can be terminated for virtually any
reason will submit to any number of degradations, and supervisors will be
tempted to force her to do so. The result is to entrench a hierarchy within
the workplace, in which a boss’s dominion over the worker goes beyond
what simply serves the productive mission of the workplace and potentially
extends to any aspect of the worker’s life. As Clyde Summers argues, the
social relations engendered by the at-will rule reflect a “deeply rooted conception of the employment relation as a dominant-servient relation”—in
which “[t]he employer is sovereign over his or her employee subjects”—
“rather than one of mutual rights and obligations.”98 A relationship in which
one party is so subject to the whims of the other is not a relationship of
equality and mutual respect.99
Defenders of at-will employment make two basic arguments against
abandoning the rule. First, they argue that, because it is merely a default
rule, employers and employees are free to contract around it. If employees
have not sought just-cause protection in their employment contracts, these
defenders contend, that indicates that employees value those protections less
than they value whatever they receive from employers in exchange for giving
the protections up.100 This argument is substantially undermined by the
findings that workers often assume that they cannot be discharged arbitrarily, even when the law in fact provides them no such protection.101
The second argument in defense of employment at will involves employer cost. A just-cause regime, defenders of the at-will relationship argue,
97.

Blades, supra note 68, at 1405.

98. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 65, 78 (2000).
99. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
779, 791 (1994) (suggesting that critics of the employment-at-will rule invoke “notions of
equality” or “civic equality and respect” when they “claim that the rule reflects an inadequate
kind of valuation of workers because it subjects them to the whim of employers”).
100. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 953–56; J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L.
Rev. 837, 898–900.
101. See Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 146–48 (1999);
Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 6, 9 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 105–06 (1997);
Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447, 452; Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them:
Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just
Cause Protection, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 307, 317–38 (2002).
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imposes significant costs on employers by making it too difficult to discipline shirking employees and entangling them in costly litigation when they
attempt to do so.102 This is an entirely appropriate cost to consider in framing employment law rules. Yet key proposals to replace at-will employment
already take account of it. One way they do this is by giving employers significant leeway in determining what sort of performance a worker’s job requires. The Model Employment Termination Act, for example, defines the
“good cause” necessary for termination in a manner that is quite deferential
to employers’ interests in defining what is necessary job performance.103 It
would not even apply this good-cause requirement until an employee had
worked for an employer for at least a year; during the one-year probationary
period, the at-will rule would continue to prevail.104 And it provides that the
good-cause standard would be enforced in relatively streamlined arbitration
proceedings.105
The Model Employment Termination Act has drawn criticism from
both the employer and the employee perspective.106 There is no need, for
present purposes, to endorse or reject the precise compromise it draws. The
crucial points are these: First, the longstanding challenges to employment at
will draw support from (and at times have rested on arguments indistinguishable from) the social equality approach I defend in this Article. Second,
as my argument demands, legislation overturning employment at will can
strike at the doctrine’s most significant threats to social equality without
imposing undue costs on particular employers.
B. Worker Privacy
Social equality demands protection of employees’ privacy. The at-will
rule does not just enable individual bosses or supervisors to engage in arbitrary or abusive conduct. It also enables employers to adopt policies that
intrude on what are generally understood to be the “private” lives of workers.107 The concept of privacy is notoriously broad. As Pauline Kim notes, it
“has been invoked to protect a variety of distinct interests in the workplace,”
including workers’ “bodily integrity,” their interest in “avoiding intrusion on
102. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 964–66; Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 8, 50–51 (1993).
103. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act,
69 Wash. L. Rev. 361, 371–72 (1994).
104. See id. at 372.
105. See id. at 376–79; see also William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in
Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 885,
908 (“The first basic ingredient [in just-cause legislation] should be arbitration, its virtues
being speed, economy, and informality.”).
106. E.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 426–27 (2002).
107. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
Ohio St. L.J. 671, 676 (1996) (“[A]ny meaningful protection of employee privacy requires
limitation of an employer’s power to fire at will.”).
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physical spaces,” their property interest in their “personal items,” and their
interest in “preventing disclosure of personal information,” as well as more
general interests in “individual autonomy.”108 Under the privacy rubric,
workers have challenged employers’ regulation of off-work activity—like
dating, smoking, and volunteering at a worker’s chosen charity—as well as
employers’ at-work intrusions on their bodies, effects, or personal spaces.109
Some of these challenges have been successful; many have not.
These privacy claims are often understood as invoking a purely individualistic interest in liberty, autonomy, or dignity.110 But they also quite directly implicate social equality. Privacy norms do more than protect
individual liberty or autonomy. They also mark a person’s status as a full
member of the community. As the philosopher Jeffrey Reiman argued nearly
four decades ago, “Privacy is an essential part of the complex social practice
by means of which the social group recognizes—and communicates to the
individual—that his existence is his own.”111 To deny certain persons or classes of persons the privacy normally accorded to others is therefore to deny
them “the respect normally accorded to full-fledged members of the
community.”112
That employee privacy cases implicate social equality thus seems fairly
clear. How a social equality perspective should alter the resolution of those
cases is less clear. Where there is a broad social consensus supporting certain
aspects of privacy, a boss who denies a worker those aspects of privacy does

108. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 901,
901 (2012).
109. For a general treatment of these issues, see Matthew W. Finkin, Privacy in
Employment Law (3d ed. 2009).
110. For a good recent example of this attitude, see Steven L. Willborn, Consenting
Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 La. L. Rev. 975 (2006). Professor
Willborn’s article may be read as suggesting that allowing employers to limit workers’ privacy
actually serves social equality because employees will presumably obtain something in return
for accepting employers’ limits. Allowing such restrictions of privacy thus serves the workers’
interest in choosing whether to prefer privacy or additional compensation. Professor Willborn
makes a powerful argument, but it does not undermine my basic point that privacy protections serve social equality. Professor Willborn himself notes that “consent in the workplace is
suspect and compromised.” Id. at 976. Moreover, just like in the context of at-will employment, a legal regime marked by formal contractual equality can nonetheless construct a workplace that is marked by undue hierarchy and inequality of status.
111.
(1976).

Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26, 39

112. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 968 (1989); see also Kim, supra note 107, at 692 (common law privacy torts are concerned with those violations “which threaten an individual’s
identity by withdrawing the deference normally afforded a member of the community”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (“To equate privacy with
dignity is to ground privacy in social forms of respect we owe each other as members of a
common community.”).
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seem to be asserting “the employer’s higher status and the employee’s subordination.”113 Searches of one’s purse or one’s body, or regulations of what
workers do in their own homes or on their own time, seem to violate these
common understandings of privacy. Accordingly, a social equality approach
can applaud the common law analysis applied in many states—an analysis
that focuses on expectations of privacy and that is typically skeptical of bodily intrusions and searches of personal items.114 It can also applaud the statutes in many jurisdictions that prohibit employers from taking adverse
action on the basis of their employees’ lawful, off-work activities.115
By using existing practices and norms to define the boundaries of permissible practices, the approach of current workplace privacy laws is conventionalist. And conventionalist approaches to privacy have long-understood
problems.116 A conventionalist approach can rein in outlier employers—
those who are acting in a manner inconsistent with what are then-widespread social norms—but it provides no ready basis to challenge existing
norms. Moreover, as ongoing changes to the organization of work blur the
boundaries between “work time” and “non-work time,” and as employers
are increasingly conscious of the contribution of off-work activities to employees’ health insurance costs, current norms may change.117 Finally, these
social norms may themselves be affected by what the law permits or prohibits. Because statutory and common law permitted so many employers to test
their employees for drug use, for example, that practice became sufficiently
widespread in the 1980s and 1990s that there is substantially less of a social
norm against submission to urinalysis than there was thirty years ago.118 On
the flip side, public attitudes toward cigarette smoking have rapidly evolved
in such a negative direction that it is plausible that employers’ prohibition of
employees’ off-work smoking could become equally normalized—but for

113. Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 La. L. Rev. 1111, 1120 (2006) (referring to privacy
in the context of employer-mandated dress codes).
114.
906–08.

For a good recent summary of common law analysis, see Kim, supra note 108, at

115. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The
Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591–95 (2009).
116. See Mark Tushnet, Legal Conventionalism in the U.S. Constitutional Law of Privacy,
17 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 141, 154–60 (2000).
117. See Henderson, supra note 115, at 1528–30; Kim, supra note 108, at 908–14; James
A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior, 43 Ga.
L. Rev. 133, 146–53 (2008). These norms were very much contested in the negotiations surrounding the wellness provisions of the Affordable Care Act, which ultimately gave employers
more power than they previously held to financially incentivize healthy conduct by their employees. See John E. McDonough, Inside National Health Reform 191–94 (2011).
118. For a good discussion of the expansion of workplace drug testing and the legal
response to it, see Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee
Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 La. L. Rev. 1009 (2006).
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the widespread passage of statutes protecting workers’ lawful off-duty conduct.119 Social norms about privacy are in part endogenous to law, so those
norms appear to provide no independent basis for determining what the law
should permit or prohibit.
These points demonstrate that workplace privacy protections cannot be
purely conventionalist. A social equality perspective cannot precisely answer
the question of where to draw the line of privacy protection, but it does
suggest three points that may help guide the search for answers. First, simply
because an employer may have a financial interest in regulating an employee’s conduct outside the workplace or after working hours, that does not
imply that the law should permit the employer to define the employee’s job
as including compliance with regulations of such conduct. As I noted above,
employment discrimination law limits employers’ ability to define their employees’ jobs in ways that threaten significant equality interests, even if employers would realize a financial benefit by defining the job in such ways.120
Southwest Airlines may profit by requiring its flight attendants to be female
sex objects for a predominantly male, business-traveler clientele, but the law
prohibits it from doing so.121 The threat to gender equality of employers
adopting such policies is too great, and the cost to the airline of abandoning
such a policy is sufficiently small, to justify a prohibition.
An analogous point applies to off-work activities. The opportunity to
choose one’s own recreational and avocational activities is a key part of what
it means to be a full member of our society. Those are often the activities in
which individuals develop their sense of personal identity and their ties with
like-minded people in the community. To allow an employer to use its economic power over an employee to regulate those activities threatens social
equality. To be sure, an employer may experience some increase in healthcare costs if its employees engage in risky activities. Or it may experience
some reputational costs if its employees engage in controversial activities.122
119. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2007) (generally prohibiting employers from “terminat[ing] the employment of any employee due to that employee’s engaging in
any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours”); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 31-40s (2007) (generally providing that “[n]o employer or agent of any employer shall
require, as a condition of employment, that any employee or prospective employee refrain
from smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his employment, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment for smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his
employment”).
120. See supra Section I.C.
121. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 293, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(rejecting claim that “femininity, or more accurately female sex appeal,” is a BFOQ for the job
of flight attendant).
122. Consider the recent example of Michael Brutsch, who was fired from his job at a
financial services company after Gawker revealed that he was the individual, known on the
Reddit website as “Violentacrez,” who “posted pictures and hosted discussions about dead
teenage girls, rape, and anti-Semitism.” Meredith Bennett-Smith, Reddit Troll Michael Brutsch
Looks for Work in Porn, Tries to Put ‘Jailbait’ Experience to Use, Huffington Post (Oct. 24,
2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/reddit-troll-michael-brutschlooking-for-work-in-porn_n_2009815.html.
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But the cost in the run of cases is unlikely to be so great as to justify the
threat to social equality posed by allowing employers to regulate worker conduct outside the workplace and after working hours.123 Exceptions to this
principle might exist in those categories of cases in which the cost to the
employer is likely to be especially large. These categories might include very
high-level employees whose controversial actions are especially likely to be
reasonably attributed to the employer,124 or individuals with truly unique
talents who could leave the employer in the lurch if they were injured while
engaging in especially risky activities.125
Second, certain privacy protections might be central to protecting other
aspects of social equality, such as access to political and civic life. Professor
Kim, for example, argues that workers should be protected from employer
surveillance of their communications to ensure that they have the space to
develop and transmit ideas and information that are socially valued—particularly ideas and information regarding their employers’ violations of law.126
A social equality perspective suggests that employees should be entitled to
some such degree of protected space regardless of whether existing social
norms promote it.127
Finally, a social equality analysis can look to whether different classes of
workers are treated differently. If employers subject production-line workers
to intrusions on their persons, their effects, or their lives that go beyond the
intrusions to which they subject supervisors and managers, that disparity
suggests that the intrusions play a role in establishing or maintaining a status
hierarchy.128 Absent a strong business reason for drawing the distinction—
and, for the reasons I have discussed, business reasons should if anything
123. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66
La. L. Rev. 1035, 1052–56 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in their
ability to regulate worker conduct off the job).
124. See id. at 1053–54. Under such a rule, for example, the Cleveland Clinic could
refuse to hire a smoker as a medical director but would be barred from refusing to hire a
smoker to work on a loading dock. Cf. A.G. Sulzberger, Hospitals Shift Smoking Bans to Smoker
Ban, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/us/
11smoking.html (discussing Cleveland Clinic’s ban on hiring smokers).
125. For example, a professional football team may prohibit its starting quarterback
from riding a motorcycle without a helmet. See Big Ben in Serious Condition After Motorcycle
Accident, ESPN (June 13, 2006, 3:59 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=2480830.
126.

Kim, supra note 108, at 929–31.

127. Of course, an employer must have a means of protecting itself against criminal
liability should an employee, for example, download child pornography on the employer’s
computer. But employers can serve that interest without intruding on all of an employee’s
private communications.
128. Cf. Selmi, supra note 123, at 1051 (“Another way to obtain a reasonable balance
between the interests of employers and employees with respect to medical screening would be
to require employers to implement screening across-the-board, to top executives as well as
those at the bottom. My sense is that many employers would shy away from genetic testing or
other health screenings if they were also subject to the tests.”).
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point to greater intrusions on high-level employees—a social equality approach should look askance at such intrusions.
Todd Henderson is highly skeptical of laws that limit employers’ ability
to regulate their employees’ off-work activities. He asserts that employers
engage in such regulation not because of a desire to dominate their workers’
lives but simply because employers bear some of the costs of employees’ offwork choices.129 Where individuals do not bear the full costs of their conduct, Professor Henderson contends, efforts by others to regulate that conduct will be “inevitable.”130 The only question, he says, is whether private
employers will regulate more efficiently than will the government.131 Because
employers are disciplined by market constraints (in both the labor and the
financial markets) in a way that the government is not, he posits that employers are often in the best position to force workers efficiently to internalize the costs of their activities.132
Professor Henderson, however, does not persuasively undermine the
case for limiting employers’ ability to regulate off-work activities. For one
thing, his entire argument is based on the premise, largely assumed but not
proven, that market forces will ensure that such regulations serve only the
interest in “economics, not domination.”133 (I will pass over for now the
implicit normative baseline of Professor Henderson’s argument—that employers should be able to regulate workers’ off-work conduct that imposes
economic costs on them.) But Professor Henderson himself cites examples
in which employers have sought to control aspects of workers’ home lives
that would seem to have only the most tenuous relationship to the employer’s bottom line134—although he calls the employers’ conduct in these
cases “reasonabl[e]”135 and “unobjectionable.”136 Even wellness programs,
which Professor Henderson touts as substantially reducing health costs by
129. See Henderson, supra note 115, at 1519.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1552 (“[T]he only relevant question is: who is the most efficient nanny?”).
132. See id. at 1553–58, 1561–64.
133. Id. at 1534. Professor Henderson also argues that the law will constrain the most
abusive exercises of employer power to regulate employees’ private lives—an argument that
seems to deprive him of any ground on which to stand in opposing laws designed to limit
employer regulations that the political process deems abusive. See id. at 1558–59.
134. See id. at 1541 (describing how Henry Ford “deployed a team of 150 to investigate
the lifestyle of each Ford employee,” ensure that they were not participating in activities “such
as smoking, drinking, gambling, and prostitution,” and “offer employees advice on issues including childcare, money management, alcohol abuse, personal hygiene, and house maintenance”); id. at 1543 n.90 (discussing employers’ recent efforts to incentivize employees to
“tak[e] classes on managing personal finances, learn[ ] about art, teach[ ] their children not to
watch television or play video games, and so on”); cf. Morriss, supra note 14, at 1901 (quoting
one of the founders of Ben & Jerry’s as saying, “If I can fire someone for making shitty ice
cream, then I can fire them for being a shitty person.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135.

Henderson, supra note 115, at 1540.

136. Id. at 1543 n.90.
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regulating employee behavior,137 are unlikely to have the sorts of cost-reducing effects he presumes they will.138 Not only are wellness programs highly
selective in the employee behavior they seek to regulate (including lack of
exercise but excluding rock climbing that leads to expensive emergency
room and orthopedist visits, for example), but they are often based on the
unproven assumption that workers who engage in the risky behaviors that
employers do regulate actually cost the employers more than other
workers.139
To the extent that the bottom-line benefits of employer regulations of
off-work conduct are overblown, social equality concerns should be heightened. And the residual costs of avoiding such regulations are appropriately
placed on employers as the cost of ensuring that their workers can be full
members of our society. This is particularly true where, as I have suggested
it should, the law provides a defense to those categories of employers who
will face unusually high costs if they cannot regulate their employees’ offwork conduct.
Professor Henderson’s argument also rests on the unproven suggestion
that regulation of workers’ behavior is inevitable, and that where employers
cannot engage in that sort of regulation, the government will.140 But if offwork activity imposes costs on employers, there is no particular reason to
believe that the government will necessarily step in to regulate that activity if
employers cannot. Employers might well pressure the government to adopt
such regulations, but workers’ groups are likely to oppose them—particularly if those groups have succeeded in obtaining legislation denying employers the right to regulate that behavior themselves.141 And, as Professor
Henderson himself argues, an employer’s regulation of an individual’s private life is likely to be much more effective than a government’s, because the
employer does not face the administrative, constitutional, and political constraints on individual intrusions that a government does.142 Professor Henderson’s argument thus does not fatally undermine the case I have made in
this Section for limiting employers’ power to regulate most workers’ offwork conduct.
137. See id. at 1546–52.
138. See Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, Is It Time to Re-Examine Workplace Wellness ‘Get Well
Quick’ Schemes?, Health Affairs Blog (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2013/01/16/is-it-time-to-re-examine-workplace-wellness-get-well-quick-schemes/.
139. For empirically informed reasons to doubt that assumption, see Jill R. Horwitz,
Brenna D. Kelly & John E. DiNardo, Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through
Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 Health Aff. 468 (2013).
140. See Henderson, supra note 115, at 1552.
141. Indeed, Professor Henderson recognizes that regulation of worker behavior may be
an instance of a collective action problem in which market forces will not operate to check
employers’ intrusive regulations, even if those regulations are inefficient because of the high
costs they impose on workers. Id. at 1584. If that is the case, a law denying employers the
power to regulate off-work conduct will not necessarily be followed by a law giving that power
to the government.
142. Id. at 1564, 1576.
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C. Workers’ Political Speech and Activities
I turn now to the example with which I began this Article: employers’
regulation of workers’ political speech and activities. I contend that employment law should generally prohibit employers from requiring or preventing
workers from engaging in off-work political speech, with exceptions for particularly small companies, the highest-level managers, and a confined class
of individuals hired specifically to engage in political speech on behalf of the
employer. I begin by discussing, in Section II.C.1, the social equality issues
that underlie this proposal. I then turn, in Section II.C.2, to what I believe is
the proper doctrinal response. Section II.C.3 addresses the special constitutional issues in this context.
1. The Social Equality Case for Constraining Employers’ Regulation of
Employees’ Political Speech
Each election cycle, the press offers numerous accounts of employers’
efforts to encourage their employees to support or oppose particular candidates or ballot propositions. Often, these efforts are backed by (implicit or
explicit) threats to retaliate against employees who vote or engage in political
speech on behalf of the “wrong” side. The 2012 election was no exception. If
anything, as the first presidential election after the Supreme Court loosened
restrictions on corporate political speech in Citizens United v. FEC,143 the
2012 election seemed to mark a newly aggressive approach by employers.144
Some of these employer efforts appeared simply to reflect an aggressive
effort by management to let employees know which candidates’ election
would, in their view, best serve the company’s interests. For example, Wynn
Resorts issued its employees a sixty-seven-page “Voter Guide” telling them
which candidates the company supported.145 But even there, some employees detected a coercive overtone. In light of the Voter Guide and the company CEO’s “fiery diatribes against [President] Obama during TV
appearances and corporate conference calls,” one Wynn employee told a reporter that “ ‘[i]f [she] had an Obama bumper sticker, [she’d] be scared for
[her] job,’ ” and that she was “worried what might happen to employees
who are caught backing non-Wynn-sponsored candidates outside work, like
with ‘a yard sign, a donation or a blog [post].’ ”146
143. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
144. See Steven Greenhouse, Here’s a Memo from the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/us/politics/bossesoffering-timely-advice-how-to-vote.html.
145. Nate C. Hindman & Christina Wilkie, Wynn Employee Voter Guide Pressures Workers to Vote Right, Huffington Post (Oct. 26, 2012, 8:38 AM) (updated 11:20 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/wynn-employee-voter-guide_n_2018595.html.
146. Id. (last alteration in original). In 2004, a company that makes home insulation
fired an employee “for driving to work with a Kerry–Edwards bumper sticker in the rear
windshield of her” car. Timothy Noah, Bumper Sticker Insubordination, Slate (Sept. 14, 2004,
6:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2004/09/
bumper_sticker_insubordination.html.
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Another employer, Georgia Pacific, issued a similar voter guide, while
also enforcing a social media policy in a way that employees perceived to
target their private posting of political articles on Facebook.147 And other
employers combined appeals to their employees to vote for Governor Romney with predictions (or perhaps threats) that President Obama’s reelection
would lead them to lay off workers.148 In still other companies, CEOs sent
fundraising appeals for Governor Romney’s campaign to all of their employees.149 As Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres show, this sort of employer conduct is hardly new: “When William Jennings Bryan squared off against
William McKinley for the presidency in 1896, the head of Steinway piano
warned his workers, ‘Men, vote as you please, but if Bryan is elected tomorrow, the whistles will not blow Wednesday morning.’ ”150 The reported
conduct of Murray Energy, with which I began this piece, is exemplary.
Even outside the realm of electoral politics, employers might perceive an
interest in regulating the off-work political speech of their employees. In the
well-known Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co. case, for example, an insurance company fired a claims manager for “refus[ing] to participate in [a
company-supported] lobbying effort” and for privately stating “opposition
to the company’s political stand.”151 Employers often discipline or fire employees who publicly oppose their company’s position on political issues.152
And a company might deem it best to fire, or not hire, an employee whose

147. See Mike Elk, Koch Sends Pro-Romney Mailing to 45,000 Employees While Stifling
Workplace Political Speech, In These Times (Oct. 14, 2012), http://inthesetimes.org/article/
14017/koch_industries_sends_45000_employees_pro_romney_mailing (“When McKinney applied for a foreman job at the plant in May, he says, his supervisor informed him that a
higher-up said he wouldn’t get the job because he was ‘too political.’ ‘They said I should be
aware of what I am posting online,’ says McKinney.”).
148. E.g., Greenhouse, supra note 144 (“ ‘The economy doesn’t currently pose a threat
to your job. What does threaten your job, however, is another four years of the same presidential administration,’ Mr. Siegel wrote. ‘If any new taxes are levied on me, or my company, as
our current president plans, I will have no choice but to reduce the size of this company.’ ”).
149. For examples, see Andy Kroll, CEO of International Corporation Sends Romney
Fundraising Pitch to His Employees, Mother Jones (Oct. 25, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/10/romney-fundraising-email-ceo-incomm-brooks-smith,
and Arthur Allen, CEO of ASG, Sent Email Pressuring Employees to Donate to Mitt Romney,
Huffington Post (Oct. 20, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/20/
arthur-allen_n_1992370.html.
150. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Election Bosses: How to Stop Employers from Telling
Workers Whom to Vote for, Slate (Nov. 2, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/how_congress_can_stop_employers_from_telling_work
ers_how_to_vote.html.
151.

721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983).

152. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 736 (Idaho 2003)
(employee fired for publicly opposing land development project that his employer supported).
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political speech is repugnant to the company’s owner or “alienates coworkers, customers, or political figures” who regulate the company.153 Such an
employee may, but need not, express especially extreme political views.154
These practices raise significant concerns from a social equality standpoint. In each case, an employer is using its economic power over its employees as leverage to obtain greater power in the political sphere. Workers,
fearful of losing their jobs, will suppress their own political views or express
views with which they do not agree.155 The result will be a skewed political
discourse, in which employers’ voices are amplified and workers’ are
squelched.156 Where an employee suppresses political speech that relates to
the actions of her employer or industry—such as speech about health or
safety hazards, sharp financial practices, or the employer’s compliance with
regulations addressing those types of harms—the political discourse may
lose out on a particularly distinctive and important perspective.157 I address
whistleblowing speech of this nature in Section II.D below. But even where
the suppressed speech relates to matters entirely separate from the workplace, an employer’s ability to translate its economic power into enhanced
political power poses a threat to social equality.158
153. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection
Against Employer Retaliation, 16 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 295, 301 (2012).
154. See Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 Berkeley
J. Emp. & Lab. L. 377, 389 (2003) (“Maybe the employee’s political activities and public statements have been considered extremely offensive (such as being a grand dragon of the KKK, or
speaking out in support of pornography or pedophilia), and the employer may say it is responding to pressures from other employees and customers. Other times, the worker’s politics
may simply be in conflict with those of a boss who prefers to have like-minded people working
for the enterprise.” (footnote omitted)). For a relatively recent example of an individual being
fired for extreme views that seem to have no bearing on the employee’s ability to do the job,
see Timothy Noah, Can Your Boss Fire You for Your Political Beliefs?, Slate (July 1, 2002, 7:14
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/07/can_your_boss_fire
_you_for_your_political_beliefs.html (describing the case of a sewing-machine operator who
was fired by Goodwill Industries in 2002 for supporting the Socialist Workers Party).
155. See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 9–13
(1998) (discussing the pressures toward worker self-censorship); Maltby, supra note 4 (“People
need their jobs, and many will sacrifice their rights as citizens to continue to provide for
themselves and their families.”).
156. See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of
Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL . L. REV . 689, 692 (“It makes little
difference . . . whether a person who speaks out is discharged by a public or private employer.
Political discussion is equally impoverished, the marketplace of ideas similarly distorted, and
respect for the person no less denied.”).
157. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 Ind. L.J. 101,
111 (1995). For a general argument that the law should protect “citizen employees” who,
among other things, bring employer wrongdoing to the attention of the public, see Richard R.
Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 La. L. Rev. 237 (2009).
158. Cf. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.
L. Rev. 685, 710 (1991) (arguing, from a civic republican perspective, that “citizens should be
protected from employers’ compulsion or penalization of political activity” and that the law
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2. The Doctrinal Response
The social equality approach suggests that employment law should address this threat. And the law already does to some extent. The courts in
most states recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination against
public policy.159 But courts have generally not used the public policy tort to
protect workers’ political speech. The one notable exception is the decision
in Novosel, in which the Third Circuit, sitting in diversity, predicted that
Pennsylvania law would protect an employee against discharge for refusing
to engage in a lobbying campaign sponsored by his employer.160 Subsequent
Pennsylvania cases have discredited that prediction, and courts elsewhere
have not taken up the Novosel doctrine.161 Many state statutes, however, protect workers’ political speech against retaliation by their employers. Professor Volokh recently explained that “[a]bout half of Americans live in
jurisdictions that protect some private employee speech or political activity
from employer retaliation.”162 But these statutes have widely disparate coverage.163 Connecticut’s statute is the only one broad enough to apply “the
same rules to private employers as are applied to public employers under the
First Amendment.”164
A social equality perspective suggests that these aspects of employment
law are moving in the right direction, but they do not go far enough. Social
equality demands a general prohibition of adverse employment actions
against employees who engage or refuse to engage in off-work political
speech, including political contributions and volunteering. To be sure, an
employer has a number of legitimate and wholly business-related interests in
its employees’ off-work speech. Like worker privacy, the law governing
worker speech should take account of those interests without permitting
them simply to trump the interest in social equality.
What are an employer’s financial interests in regulating an employee’s
political speech outside the workplace and after working hours? I can imagine several. For one thing, customers may attribute that speech to the employer. If they object to an employee’s off-work speech, they may punish the
should provide “speedy and effective legal remedies from discharge, reduction in job benefits,
and other employer-controlled penalties for political activity”).
159. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2009).
160.

Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896–901 (3d Cir. 1983).

161. See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 618–20 (3d Cir. 1992); see also
Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 738–39 (Idaho 2003) (“[T]he public policy adopted in Novosel has not been endorsed by any other court, not even the Pennsylvania
state courts within the federal district of the Circuit that issued Novosel.”); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 589 (W. Va. 1998) (“Novosel is dubious authority
today.”).
162.

Volokh, supra note 153, at 297 (emphasis added).

163. See id. at 309–34.
164. Id. at 311; see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (2009).
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employer.165 Coworkers or managers may also have a difficult time working
with an individual who engages in off-work speech that they find offensive
or with which they fundamentally disagree. This may be a particular problem in small or closely held companies. Finally, an employer may engage in
political speech of its own solely to enhance its bottom line (which seems to
be what was going on in Novosel). As Matthew Bodie explains, “Companies
make political contributions and spend on political advertising because it’s
good for business—their business.”166 An employer’s speech in this regard
can be blunted or undermined by employees’ off-work speech—particularly
if the employees are hired specifically to express the corporation’s political
message or are so highly ranked that their speech (even out of the office) will
likely be attributed by observers to the corporation.167
Of course, an employer may have more ideological and less bottomline-oriented reasons for regulating or compelling its workers’ speech on
political issues. A company may be owned by staunch opponents or proponents of the war in Afghanistan. If the owners want to exercise their right,
protected by the Supreme Court in Citizens United and earlier cases,168 to
spend their company’s treasury to support their preferred cause, they will
have to do so by hiring someone to speak on their behalf. Just as in the cases
of bottom-line-oriented speech, an employer will have an interest in ensuring that those it hires to engage in ideological speech do not undermine that
message.
Any protection of private employee speech must take account of legitimate employer interests like these. For example, such a protection could
exempt particularly small employers, or perhaps closely held corporations or
nonprofit organizations. It could exempt the highest-ranking executive employees whose speech will be “readily identified with the employer.”169 It
could also exempt cases in which speaking or refusing to speak on a particular topic can be regarded as a BFOQ. Such a rule would enable an employer

165. In 1982, for example, the Boston Symphony Orchestra canceled a contract with
Vanessa Redgrave to narrate a performance of “Oedipus Rex” after subscribers and community
members protested Redgrave’s support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. See Redgrave
v. Bos. Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting Redgrave’s civil
rights claim but affirming a judgment in her favor for breach of contract).
166. Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech: A Response
to Professor Sachs, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 206, 206 (2012).
167. In 1986, for example, the large defense contractor Raytheon fired its chief lobbyist
after he spoke at a press conference and advocated a reduction in defense spending. See Korb v.
Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370, 371–72 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting the lobbyist’s wrongful termination claim). See generally Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 41–43
(2009) (describing evidence that onlookers often attribute the views of one’s associates to
oneself).
168. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
169.

Selmi, supra note 123, at 1054.
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to control the off-work speech of a lobbyist or other individual hired specifically to engage in political speech without permitting the employer to control every worker’s speech outside the workplace.
Like in the employment discrimination context, a BFOQ doctrine would
eliminate some of the employer’s traditional prerogative to define employees’ jobs. To take a recent example, Starbucks may wish to define the job of a
barista as someone who brews espresso drinks while writing messages on
cups urging a solution to the fiscal cliff,170 just as airlines in the 1970s attempted to define the job of a flight attendant as helping customers get from
place to place while appealing sexually to male business travelers. But individual employment law, like employment discrimination law, should nonetheless deny the employer the ability to avoid its regulations by definitional
fiat. A BFOQ rule resists an employer’s ability to casually and opportunistically leverage its economic power over the speech of employees whom the
employer can control simply because of the employees’ economic dependence on the enterprise. But it leaves employers free to hire individuals specifically for the purpose of speaking on behalf of the enterprise and to
ensure the effectiveness of their speech.
3. Constitutional Questions
There remains the question whether a law prohibiting private employers
from controlling their workers’ political speech—even with the exceptions I
have suggested—would be consistent with current First Amendment doctrine.171 After all, an employer’s interests in this context—in avoiding having
others attribute speech with which it disagrees to it, and in engaging in political speech of its own—are interests that the Supreme Court has found to
be constitutionally based. These are complex issues that deserve an article of
their own. For now, let me sketch (far too simplistically) the reasons why I
believe that a law like the one I have defended is consistent with current First
Amendment doctrine.
The Supreme Court has held that a state may require a “business establishment” to associate itself in some ways with a third party’s speech, at least
so long as the views of the speaker “will not likely be identified with those of
the owner,” “no specific message is dictated by the State,” and the business
“can expressly disavow any connection with the message.”172 A law prohibiting employers from disciplining workers for off-work speech would not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, as it would apply no matter what
170. See Kevin Drum, Starbucks CEO Should Leave His Baristas Alone, Mother Jones
(Dec. 28, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/12/starbucks-ceoshould-leave-his-baristas-alone.
171. Cf. Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1537 (1998) (arguing
that imposing First Amendment norms on private entities may actually threaten First Amendment values).
172. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980); see also Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006) (reaffirming this aspect of
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message the employer or employee wished to express or suppress.173 And
when an employee speaks about political issues on her own time, her speech
is not likely to be understood as expressing her employer’s views (at least
where she neither was hired specifically as a spokesperson or lobbyist nor
occupies such a senior position in the company as to be understood as
speaking for it at all times). Indeed, the very existence of a law protecting the
off-work political speech of employees should undercut any suggestion that
that speech could be attributed to the employer. The Court has explained
that “high school students can appreciate the difference between speech a
school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to
do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.”174 The same point applies here. In
any event, the employer can always disavow an employee’s off-work
speech—whether through a general disclaimer of responsibility for anything
an employee says outside the workplace or in response to a specific act of
speech that the employer, customers, or coworkers find particularly
offensive.
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court held that requiring an “expressive association”—a category the Court defined as including the Boy
Scouts—to admit to membership an individual who (in his outside life)
vocally disagreed with the association’s message violated the First Amendment.175 The Court concluded that such forced membership significantly
burdened the association’s message without serving a sufficiently strong interest.176 But a commercial enterprise’s hiring and retention of an employee—at least where the employee is not hired specifically to express a

PruneYard); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 576–77,
580 (1995) (reaffirming this aspect of PruneYard, but holding that the First Amendment prohibited the state from requiring operators of “an expressive parade” to include participants
expressing a message with which they disagreed, where inclusion of those participants would
dilute “the parade’s overall message” and disavowal by the parade operators would be
impractical).
173. Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (requiring utility company to include in its billing mailer statements from third parties chosen specifically because they disagree with the company’s views is viewpoint-discriminatory and impermissibly burdens the company’s right to express its views).
174. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65. One cannot, of course, press this point too far without
eliminating any constitutional protection against forced association with another’s speech. But
in the context of off-work speech by ordinary employees, one need not push the point to the
logical limit. Unless such an individual expressly refers to her status as an employee of a particular employer, it is fair to insist that the employer not act on the premise that the individual’s
speech will be attributed to it. Cf. Selmi, supra note 123, at 1054 (arguing that, when the
worker does expressly refer to her status as its employee, an employer may require her to make
clear that she speaks only for herself).
175.

530 U.S. 640, 653–54, 656 (2000).

176. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 (2012) (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, to support its holding that
the First Amendment protects a church’s choice of whom to admit to the ministry).
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message—seems a far cry from an expressive association’s decision to admit
an individual to membership.177
To be sure, the Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that the government may not prohibit a corporation from engaging in political speech.178 A
corporation can act only through its employees. To engage in its constitutionally protected political speech, then, a corporation must be free to hire
individuals to speak on its behalf. And it must be free to require those individuals not to undercut the message it has hired them to express. But that
does not mean that an employer has a constitutional right to transform the
speech of all of its employees—even those who are hired to engage in productive activity quite distinct from expressing a message—into the speech of
the corporation.
In the context of government speech, the Court has held that the government may hire contractors to express a message and may take measures
to ensure that those contractors do not undercut that message.179 But it has
suggested that the government may not regulate those contractors—nor, notably, their employees—in their speech outside the contract.180 Similarly, the
Court has said that public employers can regulate off-work speech when
employees deliberately seek to link that speech to their employers.181 But it
has not held that public employers can regulate their employees’ off-duty
speech when the workers do not seek to draw such a link.182 Consistent with
current First Amendment doctrine, courts could draw a similar distinction
here: between a corporation’s own political speech, which the government
generally may not prohibit, and the political speech of its employees on their
own time, which the government may regulate the corporation to protect.183
177. Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69 (concluding that permitting military personnel to
recruit at law schools did not violate Dale because recruiters are “outsiders who come onto
campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the
school’s expressive association”). The analysis in text tracks, at a reasonably high level of abstraction, one of the leading defenses of Dale. Dale Carpenter argues that Dale protects the
right against compelled association in expressive, but not in commercial, activity. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach,
85 Minn. L. Rev. 1515 (2001). There is a substantial argument that Professor Carpenter’s
reading of Dale is too broad and unduly limits state power over even noncommercial associations. See Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to
Discriminate?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 27 (2004). If that argument is correct, my proposal
should stand on even firmer constitutional ground.
178. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886–87 (2010).
179. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
180. Id. at 197–99.
181. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam).
182. But cf. Norton, supra note 167, at 18–19 (discussing lower-court cases allowing
cities to discipline police officers for their off-duty speech). The cases discussed by Professor
Norton might be explained as applications of the principle that police officers are the sort of
employees whose speech will always be reasonably attributed by observers to their government
employers. See id.
183. It is true that the speech of many employees will be facilitated by the wages or
salaries they earn, but that does not make their speech constitutionally attributable to their
employers. “All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the
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This discussion no doubt glosses over some important points. But I
hope that I have shown that a focus on social equality supports a call for
greater protection of private employees’ off-work political speech, and that
such protection is at least plausibly consistent with current First Amendment doctrine.
D. Prohibitions on Retaliation
Social equality justifies antiretaliation laws and demands the expansion
of these laws into states that presently do not provide such protection to
employees. Employment law contains important, but incomplete, protections for workers who speak out on their employers’ violations of the law.
Antiretaliation laws centrally protect the ability of workers to participate in
public discourse in those areas in which they have the most distinctive contributions to make as employees. Along these lines, many courts have applied the public policy tort to prohibit terminating an employee because she
truthfully testified or participated in an investigation regarding her employer’s compliance with the law.184 Any number of federal and state
whistleblowing statutes—most notably the whistleblowing provisions of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act185—also protect employees against adverse treatment
taken because they reported their employers for statutory or regulatory violations or financial improprieties.186 The antiretaliation provisions of various
workplace statutes also protect employees who oppose or file complaints
against employers’ violations of those statutes.187
economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting
speech, even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree
with the speaker’s ideas.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905. There is an interesting parallel here
with the current debate over whether employers can be required to offer their workers insurance policies that cover contraception, although the religious liberty issues in that debate are
sufficiently distinct from the matters I discuss in this Article that I leave them for another day.
See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 151 (2012) (addressing those issues).
184. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445–46 (2009) (“All jurisdictions that recognize the
public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her
suspicions.”); Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects,
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1943, 1966–67 (1996) (collecting cases).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 376 (2005)
(“Sarbanes–Oxley represents the gold standard in protection of employee
whistleblowers . . . .”). The Dodd–Frank Act expanded on Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower
protections. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 73, 85–95.
186. For a comprehensive survey of state statutory and common law whistleblower protections, and of federal whistleblower statutes enacted as of 2004, see Miriam A. Cherry,
Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 1029, 1087–123 (2004).
187. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006) (“No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified
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But these laws have significant limitations. Both the public policy tort
and whistleblower statutes are inconsistent in their coverage.188 Moreover,
they typically do not protect employees’ speech to the general public.189
Rather, they are typically limited to protecting whistleblowing speech made
in one of two circumstances: (1) in conjunction with an investigation or
judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding;190 or, in some cases, (2) in
an employee’s communications with her supervisor191—although many do
not even reach the latter circumstance.192 The antiretaliation provisions of
the federal employment discrimination laws, at least, are broader in their
protection of employee speech that opposes violations of those laws.193
The public policy tort and the whistleblower and antiretaliation laws
also serve social equality in a second respect: they protect workers’ access to
the processes for petitioning the state for redress of grievances and to obtain
legal protection. Thus, courts in a number of states have held that an employer engages in wrongful discharge by firing an employee for claiming
worker’s compensation or (during layoff periods) unemployment benefits.194
The proposed Restatement of Employment Law would generalize this principle and provide a tort cause of action for employees who are disciplined
for “fil[ing] a charge or claim[ing] a benefit in good faith under . . . an
employment statute or law (irrespective of whether the charge or claim is
meritorious).”195 And numerous state and federal laws that extend rights to
employees contain their own antiretaliation provisions protecting workers
who pursue charges or claims under them.196
or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on
behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by [the Occupational Safety and Health
Act].”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII] . . . .”).
188. See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 186, at 1049–51 (“[S]tate whistleblower law is murky,
piecemeal, disorganized, and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. . . . [T]he federal statutory scheme results in a haphazard enforcement structure.”).
189. Connecticut is the only state that gives employees general free-speech protection
against private employers. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (2009).
190. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(B), (a)(2) (antiretaliation provision of
Sarbanes–Oxley Act).
191. E.g., id. § 1514A(a)(1)(C).
192. See Lobel, supra note 184, at 445–47.
193. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–80
(2009) (reading Title VII’s opposition clause broadly in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of the word “oppose”).
194. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02 reporters’ notes cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (collecting cases).
195. Id. § 4.02(c).
196. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (Fair Labor Standards Act); id. § 660(c)(1) (Occupational Safety and Health Act); id. § 2615(b)(1) (Family and Medical Leave Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (2006) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act); id. § 12203(a) (Americans with Disabilities
Act).

264

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:225

An employer that uses its economic power to prevent a worker from
reporting its violations of law threatens social equality in at least two dimensions: one that relates to dynamics outside the workplace, and the other that
relates to dynamics within the workplace. The ability to petition the government for redress of grievances, seek the protection of the laws, and call another person to account for violating one’s rights is a core aspect of
citizenship in our democratic polity.197 When employer retaliation forecloses
that ability for a worker, it denies the worker full membership in the broader
community.
But even those dynamics that are purely internal to the workplace matter for social equality. As Cynthia Estlund shows, the workplace is a central
location in our society for the development and exercise of citizenship.198
When an employer can effectively foreclose a worker from seeking redress
for a violation of the worker’s own rights that are guaranteed by law, the
employer communicates the worker’s subordinate status clearly and effectively. Retaliation exacerbates and entrenches hierarchies of status within
workplaces by “prey[ing] on the most vulnerable” employees while “simultaneously magnif[ying] the power of high-status persons” such as business
owners and supervisors.199
By helping to ensure that workers can report employers’ violations of
their legal rights, the legal suite of antiretaliation protections advances and
protects social equality. As the Supreme Court explained when it interpreted
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as including a prohibition
against retaliation, the objective of ensuring individuals effective protection
against discrimination “would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if
persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have effective protection against retaliation.”200 That is because antidiscrimination laws, like
other workplace laws, cannot be effectively enforced without individual employees’ reports of violations. Professor Estlund persuasively argues that enforcement of workplace rights depends on “vigorous encouragement and
protection of individual employees who speak up about rights and regulatory infractions.”201
But the suite of antiretaliation protections does not yet provide protection for all employees who claim violations of their workplace rights. In
particular, workers who assert rights under state law will be denied protection if they live in one of the many states that does not provide a wrongful
discharge cause of action for retaliation for the exercise of employment
197. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60 (explaining why access to such legal and
governmental processes is essential to social equality).
198. See Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace Bonds
Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (2003).
199.

Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 40 (2005).

200. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005) (quoting Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Jackson, 544 U.S. 167 (No. 021672)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201.

Estlund, supra note 185, at 376.
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rights. A social equality perspective suggests that the suite of antiretaliation
protections should be expanded to fill that gap. In particular, the wrongful
discharge tort should generally protect employees who complain about violations of their legal rights.
As with the other doctrinal areas I have discussed, employers have legitimate interests here, and the law should take account of them. For one thing,
whistleblowers’ complaints can be frivolous, asserted in bad faith, or raised
in a needlessly adversarial or disruptive manner.202 Social equality requires
that employees be able to speak out about violations of their workplace
rights or their employers’ other violations of law; it does not require that
they be permitted to use whistleblower laws to harass their employers. Accordingly, it would be fully consistent with a social equality approach to
accommodate employers’ interests here. The law might do this by explicitly
adopting a balancing test. The Connecticut statute, for example, does not
protect conduct that “substantially or materially interfere[s] with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the
employee and the employer.”203 The Connecticut courts have interpreted
that language as incorporating the Connick–Pickering doctrine from the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law, which balances the public interest
in the speech against the employer’s interest in efficiently managing the
workplace.204
But, as George Rutherglen persuasively argues, such a balancing test has
serious flaws. “The hard cases typically reduce to a direct conflict between
incommensurable rights: on the part of the employee to talk about what
goes on at work and on the part of the employer to control it.”205 The balancing test in employee speech cases thus “turns out, upon examination, to
be an illusory balance between poorly defined interests.”206 Professor
Rutherglen shows that the result is systematically to underprotect the employee’s speech interest—the interest, in my terms, in social equality—while
denying certainty and predictability to both employees and employers.207
A more promising approach would adopt specific subrules to identify
those categories of whistleblowing speech that threaten legitimate employer
interests and that can be exempted from protection without significant harm
to social equality. The proposed Restatement, for example, would protect
whistleblowing employees only when they have a good-faith belief that the
employer has violated the law.208 Further limiting employees’ whistleblowing
202. See Lobel, supra note 184, at 464–65 (describing how courts have denied protection to bad faith, frivolous, or needlessly disruptive whistleblowing speech).
203. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (2009).
204. See Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 43 A.3d 111, 121–23 (Conn. 2012).
205. George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & Pol.
129, 144 (2008).
206. Id. at 143.
207. See id. at 143–44.
208. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009).
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rights, the lower federal courts have accorded protection under antiretaliation statutes only to those workers who act on the basis of a reasonable belief
that the employer violated the law.209 These rules recognize that, given the
uncertainties of an employer’s underlying legal obligations, workers need
breathing space to complain without fear that a court will later conclude
that their employers did not violate those obligations. But they also prevent
frivolous and harassing complaints that the law need not protect to serve
social equality.
Orly Lobel contends that antiretaliation law should take account of employers’ interests in a distinct respect. She argues that the law should incentivize workers to present whistleblower complaints to their employers first
and should privilege them to complain outside the company only if the employer fails to provide satisfaction (or to create a process that one can expect
to be responsive to meritorious claims).210 One model for her approach is
the Supreme Court’s harassment jurisprudence.211 That body of law was designed to incentivize employers to create internal processes that effectively
prevent and respond to harassment and, at the same time, to incentivize
employees to take advantage of those processes.212 But that jurisprudence has
not lived up to its promise to protect employees.213 More generally, Professor
Lobel’s argument is driven by a belief in “new governance” approaches that
place a heavy premium on employer self-regulation.214 But I am skeptical
that such self-regulation can adequately preserve employees’ ability to speak
out about violations of law in the workplace.215 To the extent that Professor
Lobel argues that workers should be protected against employer retaliation
when they make internal whistleblowing complaints, I agree; such retaliation
is a major threat to social equality. But to the extent that she argues that
employers should be empowered to discipline or fire workers who make
reasonable, good-faith complaints to external authorities about violations of
law at the workplace, her proposal would undermine social equality and
should be rejected.

209. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 375, 446–51 (2010).
210.

Lobel, supra note 184, at 461–67.

211. Id. at 473–75 (citing, inter alia, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
805–08 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
212. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 41, 56–57 (1999).
213. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 24–25 (2006).
214.

Lobel, supra note 184, at 470–73.

215.

I discuss the reasons for my skepticism in Bagenstos, supra note 213, at 20–40.
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E. Arbitration
The growth of employment arbitration, aided and abetted by a number
of Supreme Court decisions,216 also raises significant concerns from a social
equality perspective.217 The doctrinal implications of those concerns, however, are less clear. Critics of arbitration argue that it operates in a manner
that undermines the rights granted by employment statutes and the common law.218 They contend that arbitration favors employers, who, as repeat
players, have an outsized influence on the selection of arbitrators.219 They
contend that virtually all of the process that arbitration removes is process
that benefits workers.220 And they note that a large number of arbitration
decisions remain confidential or are released in only a redacted form, which
undermines the public-education benefits of litigation.221 Taken together,
one critic has charged, employment arbitration provisions facilitate “a new
feudal order,” in which contract is “used to create status, or at least reinforce
the lack thereof.”222
These arguments do suggest that arbitration of employment claims undermines workers’ ability to petition their government for redress of grievances, obtain the protection of the laws, and call employers to account. They
thus provide reasons to be skeptical, from a social equality perspective, of
the spread of mandatory employment arbitration. But there is another side
216. The most notable of these have been 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement could require arbitration of individual
employees’ claims under the federal employment discrimination laws); Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to all employment contracts except those of transportation workers); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act could be subject to contractually binding arbitration).
217. See Bagchi, supra note 21, at 612–14.
218. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 695 (1996).
219. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Emp. Rts.
& Emp. Pol’y J. 189 (1997); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 379, 430 (2006) (noting various reasons to think employers have a repeat-player advantage but finding the empirical evidence “equivocal at best”). But see Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination
Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399, 400–01 (2000) (“As a matter of general practice, the use of
mandatory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for employment discrimination
claims has failed to give employers an overall advantage.” (footnote omitted)).
220. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (out) Rights, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 803, 829–33 (2009).
221. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
1631, 1672 (2005); see also Estlund, supra note 219, at 433.
222. Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1039, 1063 (1998); see also Bagchi, supra note 21, at
614 (“If employers are permitted to use biased arbitration procedures to evade even those
basic background checks on employer power imposed by law, the resulting situation of unchecked authority magnifies the disempowerment associated with low status.”).
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to the story. Many defenders of the practice contend, with some support,
that arbitration is more accessible than are judicial proceedings. In many
cases, therefore, arbitration will provide a more effective means for individual workers to obtain the protection of the laws than will a lawsuit.223 In part
for this reason, advocates of just-cause termination regimes typically argue
that those regimes should be enforced through a system of arbitration.224 But
the argument that arbitration is a more effective forum for workers to vindicate their employment rights remains highly controversial.225
For present purposes, there is no need to assess these competing claims,
which rest largely on empirical disagreements. Rather, two points are crucial. First, from a social equality perspective, we should encourage employment arbitration only if and to the extent that it advances the ability of
workers to obtain redress for their employers’ violations of their legal rights.
That arbitration may be cheaper or more efficient than a lawsuit cannot save
mandatory arbitration under a social equality analysis unless the cost savings
and efficiencies reduce the barriers to workers’ access to the process.226
Second, given the quite significant threat that arbitration poses to social
equality, courts should be vigilant in ensuring that arbitration occurs in a
procedural context that mitigates that threat. In particular, courts should
not hesitate to invalidate arbitration provisions that have the effect of keeping meritorious claims from being decided. The social equality analysis thus
provides a basis for challenging the application of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion227 to employment arbitration. In holding that a state-law prohibition on class-action bans was
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,228 the Court there gave short
shrift to the concern that class adjudication (whether in court or in arbitration) is essential to ensuring that some meritorious claims will be brought at

223. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 559, 563–66
(2001); David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink
in the Process, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 73 (1999); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory
Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 783 (2008); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 813 (2008) (finding the empirical evidence inconclusive overall, but finding reason to think that arbitration is more accessible than litigation for many low-wage employees,
though less accessible than litigation for other employees); cf. Estlund, supra note 219, at
436–37 (arguing that a fair arbitration agreement should benefit many employees).
224. See supra text accompanying note 105.
225. For a particularly powerful rebuttal, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration
and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247 (2009).
226. This seems to be largely Professor Estlund’s argument. See Estlund, supra note 219,
at 426–38.
227.

131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

228. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
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all.229 Whatever one may think about that concern in the consumer-contract
setting of Concepcion itself,230 an extension of the Court’s analysis to the
employment setting would raise serious social equality concerns.231
Consistent with my analysis, the National Labor Relations Board’s recent D.R. Horton decision held that employment arbitration agreements that
include class-action waivers are invalid.232 The Board concluded that such
agreements interfere with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in concerted action (including concerted legal action)
for their mutual aid and protection.233 The Fifth Circuit has stayed the
Board’s decision, however, and lower federal courts have so far refused to
endorse it.234 Nonetheless, a social equality perspective supports the Board’s
decision not to extend Concepcion’s holding to the employment context.235
F. Child Labor and Maximum-Hours Laws
A number of employment law doctrines can be profitably understood as
advancing a distinct aspect of social equality. These doctrines ensure that
individuals have the time, space, and ability to participate in democratic
citizenship. The significant restriction of child labor is a prime example.236
Although opponents of child labor have often made arguments that rest on a
notion of compulsion—that children cannot, as a practical matter, make a
free choice whether to work237—another significant strand of the case
229. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623 passim (2012); Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 1203,
1224–26 (2012).
230. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 157, 175–82 (2006) (arguing, before Concepcion, that mandatory arbitration clauses with
class-action bans make certain consumer claims impossible to vindicate). But cf. Omri BenShahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis passim (Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 628, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2197013 (expressing skepticism about this conclusion).
231. See Estlund, supra note 219, at 427–29 (“Both the effect of negating some
nonwaivable employee rights and the apparent purpose of foreclosing some meritorious claims
altogether condemn class action waiver clauses [in the employment setting].”).
232. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).
233. Id. at 5.
234. Andrus v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00098-JCM-VCF, 2012 WL 5989646, at
*4 n.1 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2012) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had stayed the Board’s decision).
235. For a defense of the Board’s decision on statutory grounds, see Charles A. Sullivan
& Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute
Resolution, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 1013 (2013).
236. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(l), 212 (2006) (child labor provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
237. John Stuart Mill describes this notion pithily: “Freedom of contract, in the case of
children, is but another word for freedom of coercion.” 5 John Stuart Mill, Principles of
Political Economy, ch. 11, § 9, at 1109 (Batoche Books 2001) (1848). For authors collecting
examples of these sorts of arguments, see Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and
Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards, 37 J. Econ. Literature 1083, 1093–95
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against child labor rests on a notion of democratic citizenship. To the extent
that children who work too young or for too many hours lose out on time
for education,238 child labor deprives individuals of the opportunity to develop the skills and capacity necessary for full citizenship.239
Our legal and constitutional tradition has long endorsed the role of education in developing the means to exercise equal citizenship. James
Madison’s famous letter to W.T. Barry, “applaud[ing]” what Madison called
Kentucky’s “liberal appropriations” to support “a general system of Education,” provides an early example: “A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives.”240 In recent decades, the Supreme Court has
similarly endorsed the importance of education to full social and democratic
citizenship.241 When children are forced, by their families’ economic circumstances, to work at a young age and forgo basic educational opportunities,
they are likely to become locked into an “underclass” defined by a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty and inequality.242 Laws restricting child labor are
best understood as preserving the opportunities for all children to become
full and equal citizens.
(1999), and Mark Blaug, The Classical Economists and the Factory Acts—A Re-Examination, 72
Q. J. Econ. 211 (1958).
238. The degree to which child labor displaces education will no doubt depend on the
age of the child, the number of hours worked, the educational opportunities that would otherwise be available, and other local social and economic factors. See, e.g., Basu, supra note 237, at
1093 (discussing studies showing a variety of effects of child labor on education).
239. Mill again puts the point well. He argues that “[t]here are certain primary elements and means of knowledge, which it is in the highest degree desirable that all human
beings born into the community should acquire during childhood,” and that the failure to
provide education in those elements breaches a duty “towards the members of the community
generally, who are all liable to suffer seriously from the Consequences of ignorance and want
of education in their fellow-citizens.” 5 Mill, supra note 237, ch. 11, § 8, at 1105.
240. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html.
241. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[S]ome degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship.”).
242. It was precisely this concern about creating a self-perpetuating underclass that led
the Court to strike down a law barring free public education of the children of undocumented
immigrants. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–23 (1982); id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve. And
when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group—through the State’s
action—will have been converted into a discrete underclass.”); id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[The law at issue] threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and
residents . . . .”).
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Child labor may seem a bit remote from the problems of American employment law today.243 But the scope and application of maximum-hours
laws244 to the general workforce remains a vital topic in the field. And those
laws, too, can be profitably understood as preserving the space for workers
to develop capacities for participating in social citizenship. Indeed, notions
of social citizenship played a significant part in workers’ agitation for maximum-hours laws in the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century. As one study of workers’ advocacy during the period shows, “A
persistent theme among nineteenth and early twentieth century shorter
hours advocates was that shorter hours yield enhanced leisure time with
which working people could improve their minds and become better citizens.”245 When workers repeated the slogan “Eight Hours for Work, Eight
Hours for Rest, and Eight Hours for What We Will,”246 the “what we will”
often referred to educational and civic activities.247
And the point remains a vital one today.248 A large proportion of workers are spending increasing amounts of time at work, which crowds out their
ability to engage in personal development or participate in the civic life of
their community.249 As Todd Rakoff points out, “Time spent not-working”
includes “time spent going to religious services and participating in civic
groups,” as well as “time spent forming political opinions and working as a
citizen.”250 In light of the increasing time spent at work, Professor Estlund
argues that we should treat the workplace as a central arena for civic and
democratic participation.251 But one can endorse Professor Estlund’s argument as a valid proposal for responding to work’s crowding out of civic
243. But see Marjorie Elizabeth Wood, Pitting Child Safety Against the Family Farm,
N.Y. Times (May 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/opinion/pitting-child-safetyagainst-the-family-farm.html (noting controversy over the Obama Administration’s quickly
abandoned efforts to impose new child-labor restrictions on hazardous agricultural
employment).
244. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (maximum-hours provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
245. Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeyman Bakers of New York: The Journeyman
Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 413, 443 (1994).
246. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What We Will 1 (1983)).
247. See Bewig, supra note 245, at 443–47. Indeed, some variants of the “eight hours”
slogan made the citizenship implications explicit. See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers
and Mothers 316 (1992) (reprinting a poster that rendered the slogan as “Eight hours for
work! Eight hours for sleep! Eight hours for home and citizenship!”).
248. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68
(2002) (“In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make
time available for other important social activities.”).
249. Id. at 169.
250. Id. at 68.
251. See Estlund, supra note 198. Along similar lines, Laura Rosenbury argues that we
should treat the workplace as an important locus of friendships and intimate ties. See Laura A.
Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 117 (2011).
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engagement without endorsing the underlying trend. Maximum-hours laws
provide a lever to fight that underlying trend.
The problem of overwork appears to be concentrated among “whitecollar” workers,252 many of whom are not especially wealthy or powerful
within or outside their workplaces.253 A social equality perspective might
therefore make one receptive to proposals to narrow the Fair Labor Standards Act’s white-collar exemptions.254 Commentators have suggested a
number of possibilities in this regard. Union lawyer Scott Miller proposes
replacing the white-collar exemptions with only one exemption, modeled on
the “key employee” exemption under the Family and Medical Leave Act, that
would exclude the top 10% of an employer’s workforce (defined by salary)
from maximum-hours coverage.255 Sociologist Juliet Schor similarly proposes allowing employers to “exempt the top 20% of their workforce from
the 40-hour week standard, but that they be required to designate an alternate standard of weekly and annual hours for this 20%.”256 Professor Rakoff
proposes eliminating the white-collar exemptions for those currently exempt
workers who “either have regular hours or already keep track of their hours
for business purposes.”257 He would continue to exempt only those “highlevel employees who work disparate and irregular hours without any ordinary reason to keep track of them.”258
These various proposals have their strengths and weaknesses from a policy perspective. But the problem is even more complex than that. Deborah
Malamud’s research has shown that the boundaries of the white-collar exemptions have both material and symbolic effects, and these may point in
different directions.259 Although limiting the application of the white-collar
exemptions will tend to advance social equality by freeing up more time for
newly covered workers to spend “as they will,” it may at the same time
252. See Rakoff, supra note 248, at 77–80.
253. See Adam T. Klein et al., The DOL’s New FLSA White Collar Exemption Regulations
and Working with the DOL on FLSA Actions, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 459, 462 (2006)
(noting that under the new Department of Labor regulations the white-collar exemptions can
apply to an employee with a salary as low as $23,660 per year). For a good discussion of the
application of these exemptions to retail store managers—many of whom make little more
than minimum wage—see Drew Frederick, Comment, Exempt Executives? Dollar General Store
Managers’ Embattled Quest for Overtime Pay Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 160 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 277 (2011).
254. To be sure, the problem of crowding out civic life exists for workers who are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as well. See Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 51 (2005) (responding to the problem by arguing for a statutory right to
refuse overtime).
255. See Scott D. Miller, Work/Life Balance and the White-Collar Employee Under the
FLSA, 7 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 5 (2003).
256. Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 157, 170 (1994).
257. Rakoff, supra note 248, at 81.
258. Id. at 82.
259. See Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in
New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2212 (1998).
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undermine that effect by sending the message that those workers should be
treated as having a lower status more generally. A social equality perspective
cannot answer the question of how these considerations ultimately balance
against each other.260 But I hope that I have shown that it helpfully highlights a key factor that policymakers must take into account in elaborating,
applying, and considering reforms to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Conclusion
In this Article, I have offered an egalitarian theory of individual employment law. I have argued that employment law can be profitably understood
as serving the interest in promoting social equality and that its rules can be
analyzed, defended, and critiqued based on the degree to which they advance that interest. Like I have previously argued with the rules of employment discrimination law, which also promote social equality, this Article
suggests that rules of individual employment law are justified even if they
impose costs on employers. Each employer has an obligation to spend reasonable sums to avoid contributing to social inequality. And employment
law can draw on the techniques employment discrimination law uses to ensure that particular employers are not called upon to bear too heavy a
burden.
The social equality theory illuminates a number of key issues in employment law—from the field’s most enduring questions (e.g., is employment at
will the correct baseline rule for job termination?) to those that are especially prominent today (e.g., should we protect employees’ off-work speech
and actions?). The social equality theory thus provides a fitting alternative to
existing theories of employment law, which focus either on promoting economic efficiency or on avoiding a hazily defined notion of exploitation. Social equality offers an attractive overarching theory of individual
employment law, one that offers traction in addressing important doctrinal
issues.

260. It does suggest, however, that Professor Malamud is probably correct in urging
that it is “time to genuinely rethink the FLSA and its upper-level exemptions, not merely to
‘simplify’ them or remake them to maximize employer ‘flexibility.’ ” Id. at 2319–20.
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